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Abstract
In this survey we present some of the more signicant results in the liter-
ature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce
the subject and Section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz
(1977) for the case of single-period contracts extended by many authors to the
multi-period case. The introduction of multi-period contracts raises many is-
sues that are discussed in detail; time horizon, discounting, commitment of the
parties, contract renegotiation and accidents underreporting. Section 4 covers
the literature on competitive contracts. The analysis is more complicated be-
cause insurance companies must take into account competitive pressures when
they set incentive contracts. As pointed out by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
there is not necessarily a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the presence of adverse
selection. However, market equilibrium can be sustained when principals antic-
ipate competitive reactions to their behavior or when they adopt strategies that
di¤er from the pure Nash strategy. Multi-period contracting is discussed. We
show that di¤erent predictions on the evolution of insurer prots over time can
be obtained from di¤erent assumptions concerning the sharing of information
between insurers about individuals choice of contracts and accident experience.
The roles of commitment and renegotiation between the parties to the contract
are important. Section 5 introduces models that consider moral hazard and ad-
verse selection simultaneously and Section 6 covers adverse selection when peo-
ple can choose their risk status. Section 7 discusses many extensions to the basic
models such as risk categorization, multidimensional adverse selection, symmet-
ric imperfect information, reversed or double-sided adverse selection, principals
more informed than agents, uberrima des and participating contracts.
Keywords: Adverse selection, insurance markets, monopoly, competitive
contracts, self-selection mechanisms, single-period contracts, multi-period con-
tracts, commitment, contract renegotiation, accident underreporting, risk cate-
gorization, participating contracts.
JEL Numbers: D80, D81, G22.
1 Introduction
In 1996, the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists used its annual
meeting to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
article Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Eco-
nomics of Imperfect Information. At this meeting, many papers on adverse
selection were presented and a subset of these presentations was published in a
1997 issue of the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.
One of these articles was written by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1997) them-
selves. Their main topic was the role of competition in insurance markets, with
an emphasis on underwriting in a world with imperfect information. They argue
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that insurance competition using underwriting on preexisting conditions (such
as genetic conditions) can limit the welfare benets of insurance. In this sur-
vey, we concentrate on a subset of situations involving imperfect information
in the insured-insurer relationship; we analyze situations of standard adverse
selection where the insured has more information about his risk than the in-
surer. However, we will consider extensions where insurers learn on individual
characteristics that are not known by the insureds. We will also consider the
assumption that risks are endogenous to individuals.
Adverse selection can be a signicant resource allocation problem in many
markets. In automobile insurance markets, risk classication is mainly ex-
plained by adverse selection. In health insurance, di¤erent insurance policies
or contracts are o¤ered to obtain self-selection between di¤erent groups. In life
insurance, the screening of new clients with medical exams is an accepted ac-
tivity justied by asymmetric information between the insurer and the insured.
These three resource allocation mechanisms can be complements or substitutes
and adverse selection is not always a necessary condition for their presence.
For example, in automobile insurance, we observe that insurers use risk classi-
cation and di¤erent deductible policies. Risk classication is usually justied
by adverse selection, but the presence of di¤erent deductibles can also be ex-
plained by proportional transaction costs with di¤erent observable risks and by
moral hazard. It is very di¢ cult to verifying whether the presence of di¤erent
deductibles is justied by residual adverse selection or not. Another empirical
test would be to verify whether bonus-malus schemes or multiperiod contracts
with memory are explained in various markets by the presence of moral haz-
ard, by that of adverse selection or both. We shall not discuss these tests or
these mechanisms in detail here; other chapters of this book are concerned with
these issues (Chiappori, 2012, Dionne, 2012, and Dionne and Rothschild, 2011).
Instead, we will review the major allocation mechanisms that can be justied
by the presence of adverse selection. Emphasis will be placed on self-selection
mechanisms in one-period contracting because a much of the early literature
was devoted to this subject (on risk classication, see Crocker and Snow, 2012).
We will also discuss some extensions of these basic models; particularly, the role
of multi-period contracting will be reviewed in detail. Finally, we will discuss
the more recent contributions that focus on the e¤ect of modifying the basic
assumptions of the standard models. In particular, we will see how introducing
moral hazard in the basic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model a¤ects the con-
clusions about both the nature and the existence of an equilibrium. We will also
introduce moral hazard in the monopoly model. Another subject will be insur-
ance coverage when individuals can choose their risk status. Other extensions
concern the consideration of multidimensional adverse selection (introduction of
di¤erent risk averse individuals or di¤erent privately known initial wealth com-
bined with di¤erences in risk, multiple risks), the case where the insurer is more
informed than the insured about loss probabilities (reversed adverse selection
and even double-sided adverse selection, imprecise information about accident
probabilities), adverse selection and uberrima des and nally the consideration
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of participating contracts. This survey should be considered as an update of
Dionne, Doherty and Fombaron (2000).
2 Basic assumptions and some fundamental re-
sults
Without asymmetric information and under the standard assumptions of insur-
ance models that we shall use in this article (same attitude toward risk and
same risk aversion for all individuals in all classes of risk, one source of risk, risk
neutrality on the supply side, no transaction cost in the supply of insurance, no
learning and no moral hazard), a Pareto optimal solution is characterized by full
insurance coverage for all individuals in each class of risk. Each insured sets his
optimal consumption level according to his certain wealth. No other nancial
institution is required to obtain this level of welfare. Both risk categorization
and self-selection mechanisms are redundant. There is no need for multi-period
insurance contracts because they are not superior to a sequence of one-period
contracts. Finally, the two standard theorems of welfare economics hold and
market prices of insurance are equal to the corresponding social opportunity
costs.
In insurance markets, adverse selection results from asymmetric informa-
tion between the insured (agent) and the insurer (principal). The insureds are
heterogeneous with respect to their expected loss and have more information
than the insurance company which is unable to di¤erentiate between risk types.
Naturally, the high-risk individual has no incentive to reveal his true risk which
is costly for the insurer to observe. Pooling of risks is often observed in insur-
ance markets. In fact, however, there is a tendency to equalize rather than to
di¤erentiate premiums... This constitutes, in e¤ect, a redistribution of income
from those with a low propensity of illness to those with a high propensity...
(Arrow, 1963; p. 964). One major di¢ culty is that a pooling cannot be a Nash
equilibrium.
Akerlof (1970) showed that if all insurers have imperfect information on in-
dividual risks, an insurance market may not exist, or if it exists, it may not
be e¢ cient. He proposed an explanation of why, for example, people over 65
have great di¢ culty in buying medical insurance the result is that the average
medical condition of insurance applicants deteriorates as the price level rises  
with the result that no insurance sales may take place at any price (1970; p.
492). The seminal contributions of Akerlof and Arrow have generated a prolif-
eration of models on adverse selection. In this survey we shall, however, conne
our attention to a limited subset. Many authors have proposed mechanisms
to reduce the ine¢ ciency associated with adverse selection, the self-selection
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mechanism in one-period contracts that induces policyholders to reveal hid-
den information by selection from a menu of contracts, (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976; Stiglitz, 1977; Wilson, 1977; Miyazaki, 1977; Spence, 1978; Hellwig, 1986),
the categorization of risks(Hoy, 1982; Crocker and Snow, 1985, 1986, 2000),
and multi-period contracting(Dionne, 1983; Dionne and Lasserre, 1985, 1987;
Kunreuther and Pauly, 1985; Cooper and Hayes, 1987; Hosios and Peters, 1989;
Nilssen, 1990; Dionne and Doherty, 1994; Fombaron, 1997b, 2000). All of them
address private market mechanisms. In the rst case, insurers o¤er a menu
of policies with di¤erent prices and quantity levels so that di¤erent risk types
choose di¤erent insurance policies. Pareto improvements for resource alloca-
tion with respect to the single-contract solution with an average premium to all
clients can be obtained. In the second case, insurers use imperfect information
to categorize risks and, under certain conditions, it is also possible to obtain
Pareto improvements for resource allocation. In the third case, insurers use the
information related to the past experience of the insured as a sorting device (i.e.
to motivate high-risk individuals to reveal their true risk ex ante).
Before proceeding with the di¤erent models, let us comment briey on some
standard assumptions. We assume that all individuals maximize expected util-
ity. The utility functions of the individuals in each risk group are identical,
strictly concave and satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. Utility is
time-independent, time-additive and state-independent. In many models there
is no discounting but this is not a crucial issue. Individuals start each period
with a given wealth, W, which is non-random. To avoid problems of bankruptcy,
the value of the risky asset is lower than W. All risks in the individuals portfo-
lio are assumed to be insurable. Income received in a given period is consumed
in that period; in other words, there is no saving and no banking or lending.
Insurers are risk neutral and maximize the value of their cash ows or prots.
Insurers write exclusive insurance contracts and there are no transaction costs
in the supply of insurance. Finally, the insureds are assumed to be unable to
inuence either the probabilities of accident or the damages due to accidents;
this rules out any problem of moral hazard.
To simplify the presentation we explicitly assume that insurers are risk neu-
tral. An equivalent assumption is that insurers are well diversied in the sense
that much of their total risk is diversied by their own equity holders in the man-
agement of their personal portfolios. The presence of transaction costs would
not a¤ect the qualitative conclusions concerning the e¤ects of adverse selec-
tion on resource allocation in insurance markets (see Dionne, Gouriéroux and
Vanasse, 1999, for more details). However, proportional transaction costs (or
proportional loadings) are su¢ cient to explain partial insurance coverage and
their explicit introduction in the analysis would modify some conclusions in the
reference models. For example, each individual in each class of risk would buy
less than full insurance in the presence of full information and the introduction
of adverse selection will further decrease the optimal coverage for the low-risk
individuals. Consequently the presence of adverse selection is not a necessary
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condition to obtain di¤erent deductibles in insurance markets.
The presence of many sources of non-insurable risks or of many risky assets
in individual portfolios is another empirical fact that is not considered in the
models. As long as these risks are independent, the conclusions should not be
a¤ected signicantly. However, the optimal portfolio and insurance decisions in
the presence of many correlated risks and asymmetric information in one or in
many markets is still an open question in the literature.
In reality, we observe that banks coexist with insurers that o¤er multi-period
insurance contracts. The presence of saving and banking may change the conclu-
sions obtained for multi-period contracts under asymmetric information. Par-
ticularly, it may modify accident reporting strategies and commitment to the
contracts. However, with few exceptions (Allen, 1985, moral hazard; Dionne
and Lasserre, 1987, adverse selection; Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1986, moral hazard; Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien, 2000, insurance and debt
with moral hazard), research on principal-agent relationships has not envisaged
the simultaneous presence of several alternative types of assets and institutions
(see Chiappori et al, 1994, for detailed discussion of di¤erent issues related to
the e¤ect of savings on the optimality of multi-period contracts).
The assumption of exclusive insurance contracting is discussed in Section 4
and some aspects of the discounting issues are discussed in Section 3. There
remain the assumptions on the utility function. Although the theory of decision
making under uncertainty has be challenged since its formal introduction by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (Machina, 1987, 2012), it has produced very
useful analytical tools for the study of optimal contracts such as optimal insur-
ance coverage and the associated comparative statics, and the design of optimal
contracts under moral hazard or the characterization of optimal insurance poli-
cies under adverse selection. In fact, few contributions use non-linear models
in insurance literature (see however Karni, 1992; Gollier, 2000; Doherty and
Eeckhoudt, 1995) and very few of these have addressed the adverse selection
problem. In this survey we thus limit the discussion to the linear expected util-
ity model. We also assume that utility functions are not function of the states
of the world and that all individuals in all classes of risks have the same level
of risk aversion. As we will see, some of these assumptions are not necessary to
get the desired results but permit the discussion to focus on di¤erences in the
risk types.
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3 Monopoly
3.1 Public information
There are two possible states of the world (x 2 fn; ag); state (n), "no accident"
having the probability (1  pi) and state (a), "accident" having the probability
0 < pi < 1. Consumers di¤er only by their probability of accident. For sim-
plicity, there are two types of risk in the economy (i 2 fH;Lg for High and
Low-risk) with pH > pL. Each consumer owns a risky asset with monetary
value D(x); D(a) = 0 in state (a) and D(n) = D in state (n). Therefore the
expected loss for a consumer of type i (EiD(x)) is piD.
Under public information and without transaction cost, a risk neutral private
monopoly1 would o¤er insurance coverage (net of premium) (i) for an insurance
premium (i) such that a consumer will be indi¤erent between purchasing the
policy and having no insurance (Stiglitz, 1977). In other words, the private
monopolist maximizes his total prot over i, i and i:
Problem 1
Max
i; i; i
X
qi ((1  pi) i   pii) (1)
under the individual rationality (or participating) constraints2
V (Ci j pi)  V (C0 j pi)  0 i = H;L (2)
where V (Ci j pi) is the expected utility under the contract Ci = fi; ig;
V (Ci j pi) = piU(W  D + i) + (1  pi) U(W   i);
U() is a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave function
of nal wealth(U 0() > 0; U 00() < 0);
W is non-random initial wealth;
C0 denotes no insurance; C0 = f0; 0g and
V (C0 j pi)  piU(W   D) + (1   pi) U(W ); V (C0 j pi) is the reservation
utility.
qi is the number of policies sold to consumers of type i;
i is a Lagrangian multiplier for constraint (2).
1For an analysis of several reasons why a monopoly behavior in insurance markets should
be considered, see Dahlby (1987). For examples of markets with a monopoly insurer see
DArcy and Doherty (1990) and Dionne and Vanasse (1992).
2For a detailed analysis of participation constraints, see Jullien (2000).
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It is well known that full insurance, i = D   i (for i = H;L), is the
solution to the above problem and that (2) is binding for both classes of risk,
which means that
V (Ci j pi) = V (C0 j pi) i = H;L
or
i = piD + z

i ;
where zi is the maximum unit-prot (or the Arrow-Pratt risk premium) on
each policy. In other words zi solves U(W   piD   zi ) = piU(W  D) + (1  
pi)U(W ).
The private monopoly extracts the entire consumer surplus. However, there
is no e¢ ciency cost associated with the presence of a monopoly because each
individual buys full insurance as under perfect competition3 . This is the classical
result that Pareto e¢ cient risk sharing between a risk-averse agent and a risk-
neutral principal shifts all the risk to the principal. To sum up we can write:
Proposition 1 In the presence of public information about insuredsunderlying
risk, an optimal contract between a private monopolist and any individual of type
i is characterized by:
a) full insurance coverage, i = D   i ;
b) no consumer surplus, V (Ci j pi) = V (C0 j pi).
Both solutions are shown at CH and C

L in Figure 1 where C
0 is the initial
endowment situation and where the vertical axis is wealth in the accident or
loss state and the horizontal axis is wealth in the no-loss state.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Any point to the northwest of C0 and below or on the 45 degree line rep-
resents the wealth of the insured with any contract where i  0 and i  0.
Because the monopoly solution implies no consumer surplus, it must lie on each
risk type indi¤erence curve passing through C0. These indi¤erence curves are
strictly convex because U() is strictly concave by assumption.4
3As in the perfect discrimination case, the monopolist charges a price of insurance to each
consumer equal to marginal cost. All potential consumer surplus is collected as monopoly
prots so there is no dead weight loss. This result would not be obtained with a proportional
loading.
4Since individuals of di¤erent types have the same degree of risk aversion, at each point
in the gure, the absolute value of the slope of the high-risk indi¤erence curve is lower than
that of the low-risk individual. For example at point C0; U 0(W )(1   pH)=U 0(W   D)pH <
U 0(W )(1   pL)=U 0(W  D)pL. At equilibrium points CH and CL, the respective slopes (in
absolute values) are (1  pH) =pH and (1  pL) =pL. This is true because under full insurance,
the insured of type i has W   piD   zi in each state.
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3.2 Private information and single-period contracts
Under private information the insurer does not observe the individuals risk
types5 , and must introduce mechanisms to ensure that agents will reveal this
characteristic. Stiglitz (1977) extended the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model
to the monopoly case. In both contributions, price-quantity contracts6 permit
the separation of risks by introducing incentives for individuals to reveal their
type. Low-risk individuals reveal their identity by purchasing a policy that o¤ers
limited coverage at a low unit price. Thus they trade o¤ insurance protection
to signal their identity. Formally, risk revelation is obtained by adding two
self-selection constraints to Problem 1:
V (Ci j pi)  V (Cj j pi)  0 i; j = H;L
i 6= j
(3)
Equation (3) guarantees that individual i prefers Ci to Cj . Let us use HL
and LH for the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers where HL is for the self-
selection constraint of the H type risk and LH is that for the L type. HL and
LH cannot both be positive.7 From Figure 1 it is easy to observe that, if the
high-risk individuals are indi¤erent between both contracts (HL > 0), the low-
risk individuals will strictly prefer their own contracts (LH = 0). Moreover,
LH cannot be positive when HL is zero because this leads to a violation of
(2). Therefore, a feasible solution can be obtained only when HL > 0 and
LH = 0.
Figure 1 shows the solution to the maximization of (1) subject to (2) and
(3) where low-risk individuals choose a positive quantity of insurance8 L > 0
and high-risk individuals buy full insurance coverage (H = 

H). Separation
of risks and prot maximization imply that V (CH j pH) = V (CL j pH). As
discussed above, it is clear that (2) and (3) cannot both be binding for the high-
risk individuals when it is possible for the low-risks to buy insurance. In fact,
Figure 1 indicates that CH is strictly preferred to C

H which means that high-
risk individuals get some consumer surplus when the monopolist sells insurance
5For models where neither the insurer nor the insured know the individualsprobabilities of
accident, see Palfrey and Spatt (1985), Malueg (1988), Boyer, Dionne and Kihlstrom (1989),
and De Garidel (2005).
6We limit our discussion to private market mechanisms. On public provision of insurance
and adverse selection, see Pauly (1974) and Dahlby (1981).
7Technically the preference structure of the model implies that indi¤erence curves of indi-
viduals with di¤erent risks cross only once. This single crossing property has been used often
in the sorting literature (Cooper, 1984).
8There is always a separating equilibrium in the monopoly case. However, the good-risk
individuals may not have any insurance coverage at the equilibrium. Property 4 in Stiglitz
(1977) establishes that CL = f0; 0g when qH=qL exceeds a critical ratio of high to low-risk
individuals where qi is the proportion of individuals i in the economy. The magnitude of
the critical ratio is function of the di¤erence in accident probabilities and of the size of the
damage. Here, to have CL 6= f0; 0g, we assume that qH=qL is below the critical ratio.
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to the low-risk individuals. In other words, the participation constraint (2) is
not binding for the H individuals (H = 0).
Another property of the solution is that good risk individuals do not receive
any consumer surplus (L > 0). However, as discussed above, they strictly
prefer their contract to the contract o¤ered to the bad risk individuals. In other
words
V (CL j pL) = V (C0 j pL) and V (CL j pL) > V (CH j pL),
which means that the self-selection constraint is not binding for the low-risk
individuals unlike the participation constraint.
In conclusion, one-period contracts with a self-selection mechanism increase
the monopoly prots under private information compared with a single contract
without any revelation mechanism, but do not necessarily correspond to the best
risk allocation arrangement under asymmetric information. In particular, good
risk individuals may not be able to buy any insurance coverage or, if they can,
they are restricted to partial insurance. As we shall see in the next section, multi-
period contracts can be used to relax the binding constraints and to improve
resource allocation under asymmetric information. In summary
Proposition 2 In the presence of private information, an optimal one-period
contract menu between a private monopoly and individuals of types H and L
has the following characteristics:
a) H = D   H ;L < D   L
b) V (CH j pH) > V (C0 j pH);V (CL j pL) = V (C0 j pL)
c) V (CH j pH) = V (CL j pH);V (CL j pL) > V (CH j pL):
Proof. See Stiglitz (1977).
Stiglitz (1977) also considered a continuum of agent types and showed that
some of the above results can be obtained under additional conditions. However,
in general, the presence of a continuum of agent types a¤ects the results.9
3.3 Multi-period insurance contracts
Multi-period contracts are often observed in di¤erent markets. For example,
in many countries, drivers buy automobile insurance with the same insurer for
many years and insurers use bonus-malus systems (or experience rating) to relate
insurance premiums to the individuals past experience (Lemaire, 1985; Henriet
and Rochet, 1986; Hey, 1985; Dionne and Vanasse, 1989, 1992, and Dionne et
al, 2010). Long term contracting is also observed in labor markets, workers
9 In another context, Riley (1979a) shows that a competitive Nash equilibrium never exists
in the continuum case (see also Riley, 1985).
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compensation insurance, service contracts, unemployment insurance and many
other markets. The introduction of multi-period contracts in the analysis gives
rise to many issues such as time horizon, discounting, commitment of the parties,
myopic behavior, accident underreporting, and contract renegotiation. These
issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Multi-period contracts are set not only to adjust ex-post insurance premiums
or insurance coverage to past experience, but also as a sorting device. They
can be a complement or a substitute to standard self-selection mechanisms.
However, in the presence of full commitment, ex-ante risk announcement or risk
revelation remains necessary to obtain optimal contracts under adverse selection.
In Cooper and Hayes (1987), multi-period contracts are presented as a com-
plement to one-period self-selection constraints. Because imperfect information
reduces the monopolists prots, the latter has an incentive to relax the remain-
ing binding constraints by introducing contracts based on anticipated experi-
ence over time. By using price-quantity contracts and full commitment in long
term contracts, Cooper and Hayes introduce a second instrument to induce self-
selection and increase monopoly prots: experience rating increases the cost to
high-risks from masquerading as low-risks by exposing them to second-period
contingent coverages and premia.
Cooper and Hayesmodel opens with a direct extension of the standard one-
period contract presented above to a two-period world with full commitment
on the terms of the contract. There is no discounting and all agents are able
to anticipate the values of the relevant futures variables. To increase prots,
the monopolist o¤ers contracts in which premiums and coverages in the second
period are function of accident history in the rst period. Accidents are public
information in their model. The two period contract C2i is dened by:
C2i = fi; i; ia; ia; in; ing
where a and n mean accidentand no accidentin the rst period and where
il and il(l = a; n) are contingentchoice variables. Conditional on accident
experience, the formal problem consists of maximizing two-period expected prof-
its by choosing C2L and C
2
H under the following constraints:
V (C2i j pi)  2V (C0 j pi) (4.1)
V (C2i j pi)  V (C2j j pi) i; j = H;L
i 6= j
(4.2)
where
11
V (C2i jpk)  pkU(W  D + i) + (1  pk)U(W   i)
+pk [pkU(W  D + ia) + (1  pk) U (W   ia)]
+ (1  pk) [pkU (W  D + in) + (1  pk)U (W   in)]
k = i; j i; j = H;L i 6= j:
The above constraints show that agents are committed to the contracts for
the two periods. In other words, the model does not allow the parties to rene-
gotiate the contract at the end of the rst period. Moreover, the principal is
committed to a loss-related adjustment of the insurance contract in the second
period negotiated at the beginning of the rst period. The insured is commit-
ted, for the second period, to buy the coverage and to pay the premium chosen
at the beginning of the rst period. It is also interesting to observe from (4)
that the decisions concerning insurance coverage in each period depend on the
anticipated variations in the premiums over time. In other words, (4) establishes
that variations in both premia and coverages in the second period are function
of experience in the rst period. Using the above model, Cooper and Hayes
proved the following result:
Proposition 3 In the presence of private information and full commitment,
the monopoly increases its prots by o¤ering an optimal two-period contract
having the following characteristics :
1) High-risk individuals obtain full insurance coverage in each period and are
not experience ratedbH = bHn = bHa; bH = bHa = bHn
where bH = D   bH
2) Low-risk individuals obtain partial insurance with experience ratingbLn < bL < bLa; bLa < bL < bLn
3) Low-risk individuals do not obtain any consumer surplus, and high-risk
individuals are indi¤erent between the two contracts
V
 bC2L j pL = 2V  C0 j pL ;
V
 bC2H j pH = V  bC2L j pH :
Proof. See Cooper and Hayes (1987).
The authors also discuss an extension of their two-period model to the case
where the length of the contract may be extended to many periods. They show
that the same qualitative results as those in Proposition 3 hold with many
periods.
Dionne (1983) and Dionne and Lasserre (1985, 1987) also investigated multi-
period contracts in the presence of both adverse selection10 and full commitment
10Townsend (1982) discussed multi-period borrowing-lending schemes. However, his mech-
anism implies a constant transfer in the last period that is incompatible with insurance in the
presence of private information.
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by the insurer. Their models di¤er from that of Cooper and Hayes in many re-
spects. The main di¤erences concern the revelation mechanism, the sorting de-
vice, commitment assumptions and the consideration of statistical information.
Moreover, accidents are private information in their models. Unlike Cooper and
Hayes, Dionne (1983) did not introduce self-selection constraints to obtain risk
revelation. Instead risk revelation results from a Stackelberg game where the
insurer o¤ers a contract in which the individual has to select an initial premium
by making a risk announcement in the rst period. Any agent who claims to be
a low-risk pays a corresponding low premium as long as his average loss is less
than the expected loss given his declaration (plus a statistical margin of error
to which we shall return). If that condition is not met, he is o¤ered a penalty
premium. Over time, the insurer records the agents claims and o¤ers to re-
instate the policy at the low premium whenever the claims frequency become
reasonable again.11
Following Dionne (1983) and Dionne and Lasserre (1985), the no-claims
discount strategy consists in o¤ering two full insurance premiums12 (F 1 =
fH ; Lg) in the rst period and for t = 1; 2; :::
F t+1
8<: = d if
N(t)P
s=1
s=N (t) < EdD (x) + 
N(t)
d
= k otherwise
where
d is the full information premium corresponding to the declaration (d),
d 2 fH;Lg
s is the amount of loss in contract period s; s 2 f0; Dg
k is a penalty premium. k is such that U(W   k) < V (C0 j pH)
EdD(x) is the expected loss corresponding to the announcement (d)

N(t)
d is the statistical margin of error
N(t) is the total number of periods with insurance; N(t)  t.
Therefore, from the construction of the model,
N(t)P
s=1
s=N (t) is the average
loss claimed by the insured in the rst N(t) periods. If this number is strictly
11This type of no-claims discount strategy was rst proposed by Radner (1981) and
Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) for the problem of moral hazard (see also Malueg (1986) where
the good faith strategy is employed). However, because the two problems of information
di¤er signicantly the models are not identical. First the information here does not concern
the action of the agent (moral hazard) but the type of risk which he represents (adverse
selection). Second, because the action of the insured does not a¤ect the random events, the
sequence of damage levels is not controlled by the insured. The damage function depends
only on the risk type. Third, in the adverse selection model, the insured cannot change his
declaration and therefore cannot depart from his initial risk announcement although he can
always cancel his contract. Therefore, the stronger conditions used by Radner (1981) (robust
epsilon equilibrium) and Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) (long proof) are not needed to obtain
the desired results in the presence of adverse selection only. The Law of the Iterated logarithm
is su¢ cient.
12 In fact their formal analysis is with a continuum of risk types.
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less than the declared expected loss plus some margin of error, the insurer o¤ers
d. Otherwise he o¤ers k. The statistical margin of error is used to avoid
penalizing honest insureds too often. Yet it has to be small enough to detect
those who try to increase their utility by announcing a risk class inferior to their
true risk. From the Law of the Iterated Logarithm, one can show that

N(t)
d =
q
22d log log N(t)=N(t);  > 1
where 2d is the variance of the individuals loss corresponding to the declaration
(d) and N(t)d converges to zero over time (with arbitrary large values for N(t)).
Graphically, we can represent EdD(x) + 
N(t)
d in the following way:
Insert Figure 2 here.
As N(t)  !1; EdD(x) + N(t)d  ! EdD(x).
Over time, only a nite number of points representing (s=N(t)) will have
a value outside the shaded area.
Proposition 4 below shows that the full information allocation of risks is
obtainable using the no-claims discount strategy as T  !1 and as long as the
agents do not discount the future.13
Proposition 4 Let i be such that:
i   EiD(x)  0 and U(W   i)  V (C0 j pi):
Then, when T  !1, there exists a pair of optimal strategies for the individual
of type i and the private monopoly having the following properties:
1) the strategy of the monopoly is a no-claims discount strategy; the strat-
egy of insured i is to tell the truth about his type in period 1 and to buy insurance
in each period;
2) the optimal corresponding payo¤s are i  EiD(x) = zi and U(W i ) =
V (C0 j pi); i = H;L;
3) both strategies are enforceable.
Proof. See Dionne and Lasserre (1985).
It is also possible to obtain a solution close to the public information alloca-
tion of risks in nite horizon insurance contracts. Dionne and Lasserre (1987)
13 In general, introducing discounting in repeated games reduces the incentives of telling the
truth and introduces ine¢ ciency because players do not care for the future as they care for the
current period. In other words, with discounting, players become less patient and cooperation
becomes more di¢ cult to obtain. See Sabourian (1989) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti
(1990) for detailed discussions of the discount factor issues in repeated contracts.
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show how a trigger strategy with revisions14 may establish the existence of an
" equilibrium. This concept of " equilibrium is due to Radner (1981) and was
also developed in the moral hazard context. Extending the denition to the
adverse selection problem, Dionne and Lasserre (1987) dened an " equilibrium
as a triplet of strategies (principal, low-risk individual, high-risk individual)
such that, under these strategies, the expected utility of any one agent is at
least equal to his expected utility under public information less epsilon. In fact,
the expected utility of the high-risk individual is that of the full information
equilibrium.
As for the case of an innite number of periods,15 Dionne and Lasserre
(1987) showed that it is in the interest of the monopolist (which obtains higher
prots) to seek risk revelation by the insured rather than simply use the ex-post
statistical instrument to discriminate between low-risk and high-risk agents. In
other words, their second main result shows that it is optimal to use statistical
tools not only to adjust, ex-post, insurance premiums according to past expe-
rience, but also, to provide an incentive for the insured to announce, ex- ante,
the true class of risk he represents. Finally, they conclude that a multi-period
contract with announcement dominates a repetition of one-period self-selection
mechanisms (Stiglitz, 1977) when the number of periods is su¢ ciently large and
there is no discounting. This result contrasts with those in the economic litera-
ture where it is shown that the welfare under full commitment is equal to that
corresponding to a repetition of one-period contracts. Here, a multiperiod con-
tract introduces a supplementary instrument (experience rating) that increases
e¢ ciency (Dionne and Doherty, 1994; Dionne and Fluet, 2000).
Another characteristic of Dionne and Lasserres (1987) model is that low-risk
agents do not have complete insurance coverage when the number of periods is
nite; they chose not to insure if they are unlucky enough to be considered as
high-risk individuals. However, they always choose to be insured in the rst
period and most of them obtain full insurance in each period. Finally, it must
be pointed out that the introduction of a continuum of agent types does not
create any di¢ culty in the sense that full separation of risks is obtained without
any additional condition.
14Radners (1981) contribution does not allow for revisions after the initial trigger. However,
revisions were always present in innite horizon models [Rubinstein and Yaari (1983), Dionne
(1983), Radner (1985), Dionne and Lasserre (1985)]. A trigger strategy without revision
consists in o¤ering a premium corresponding to a risk declaration as long as the average loss
is less than the reasonable average loss corresponding to the declaration. If that condition is
not met, a penalty premium is o¤ered for the remaining number of periods. With revisions,
the initial policy can be reinstate.
15See also Gal and Landsberger (1988) on small sample properties of experience rating
insurance contracts in the presence of adverse selection. In their model, all insureds buy the
same contracts, and experience is considered in the premium structure only. They show that
the monopolys expected prots are higher if based on contracts that take advantage of longer
experience. Fluet (1998) shows how a result similar to Dionne and Lasserre (1985) can be
obtained in a one-period contract with eet of vehicles.
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In Dionne (1983) and Dionne and Lasserre (1985) there is no incentive for
accident underreporting at equilibrium because there is no benet associated
with underreporting. When the true classes of risk are announced, insureds
cannot obtain any premium reduction by underreporting accidents. When the
number of periods is nite, matters are less simple because each period mat-
ters. In some circumstances, the insured has to evaluate the trade-o¤ between
increased premiums in the future and no coverage in the present. This is true
even when the contract involves full commitment as in Dionne and Lasserre
(1987). For example, the unlucky good risk may prefer to receive no insurance
coverage during a particular period to pass a trigger date and have the oppor-
tunity to pay the full information premium as long as his average loss is less
than the reasonable average loss corresponding to his class of risk.
We now address the incentive for policyholders to underreport accidents.
The benets of underreporting can be shown to be nil in a two-period model
with full commitment and no statistical instrument when the contract cannot
be renegotiated over time. To see this, let us go back to the two-period model
presented earlier (Cooper and Hayes, 1987) and assume that accidents are now
private information. When there is ex ante full commitment by the two parties
to the contract one can write a contract where the net benet to any type of
agent from underreporting is zero. High-risk individuals have full insurance and
no experience rating at equilibrium and low-risk individuals have the same level
of expected utility whatever the accident reporting at the end of the second
period. However, private information about accidents reduces insurersprots
compared with the situation where accidents are public information.
In all the preceding discussions it was assumed that the insurer can precom-
mit to the contract over time. It was shown that an optimal contract under
full commitment can be interpreted as a single transaction where the incen-
tive constraints are modied to improve insurance possibilities for the low-risk
individuals and to increase prots. Because there is full commitment and no
renegotiation, accident histories are uninformative on the risk type. This form
of commitment is optimal in Dionne (1983) and Dionne and Lasserre (1985): as
in the Arrow-Debreu world, neither party to the contract can gain from rene-
gotiation. However, in a nite horizon world, the role of renegotiation becomes
important because self-selection in the rst period implies that future contracts
might be ine¢ cient given the public information available after the initial pe-
riod. When the good risks have completely revealed their type, it becomes
advantageous to both parties   the insurer and the low-risk individuals   to
renegotiate a full insurance contract for the second period. Although the pos-
sibilities of renegotiation improve welfare in the second period, they violate the
ex-ante self-selection constraints and reduce ex-ante welfare. In other words,
renegotiation limits the commitment possibilities and reduces partieswelfare
ex-ante. For example, if the high-risk individuals anticipe renegotiation in the
second period, they will not necessarily reveal their type in the rst period
(Dionne and Doherty, 1994).
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Formally, we can interpret the possibility of renegotiation as adding a new
constraint to the set of feasible contracts; unless parties can precommit to not
renegotiate then contracts must be incentive compatible and renegotiation-proof
(Dewatripont, 1989; Bolton, 1990; Rey and Salanié, 1996). To reduce the pos-
sibilities of renegotiation in the second period, the insurer that cannot commit
to renegotiate after new information is revealed must set the contracts so that
the insured type will not be perfectly known after the rst period. This implies
that the prospect of renegotiation reduces the speed of information revelation
over time. In other words, the prospect of renegotiation can never improve
the long term contract possibilities. In many circumstances, a sequence of one-
period contracts will give the same outcome as a renegotiated-proof long term
contract; in other circumstances a renegotiation-proof long-term contract dom-
inates (when intertemporal and intertype transfers and experience rating are
allowed, for example) (Hart and Tirole, 1988; La¤ont-Tirole, 1987, 1990, 1993;
Dionne and Doherty 1994; see the next section for more details).
Hosios and Peters (1989) present a formal model that rules out any renego-
tiation by assuming that only one-period contracts are enforceable.16 They also
discuss the possibility of renegotiation in the second period when this renegoti-
ation is benecial to both parties. Although they cannot show the nature of the
equilibrium under this alternative formally, they obtain interesting qualitative
results. For example, when the equilibrium contract corresponds to incomplete
risk revelation in the rst period, the seller o¤ers, in the second period, a choice
of contract that depends on the experience of the rst period. Therefore acci-
dent underreporting is possible without commitment and renegotiation. This
result is similar to that obtained in their formal model where they ruled out
any form of commitment for contracts that last for more than one period. Only
one-period contracts are enforceable. They show the following results.17
Proposition 5 In absence of any form of commitment from both parties to the
contract:
1) Without discounting, separating equilibria do not exist; only pooling and
semi-separating equilibria are possible.
2) Accident underreporting can now a¤ect the sellers posterior beliefs about
risk types and insurance buyers may fail to report accidents to avoid premium
increases.
16On limited commitment see also Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985), La¤ont and Tirole
(1987) and Dionne and Fluet (2000).
17However, separating equilibria are possible with discounting because future considerations
are less relevant. In a model with commitment and renegotiation, Dionne and Doherty (1994)
obtain a similar result; when the discount factor is very low a separating equilibrium is always
optimal in a two-period framework. Intuitively, low discount factors reduce the e¢ ciency of
using intertemporal transfers or rents to increase the optimal insurance coverage of the low-risk
individuals by pooling in the rst period. See La¤ont and Tirole (1993) for a general discussion
on the e¤ect of discounting on optimal solutions in procurement when there is no uncertainty.
See Dionne and Fluet (2000) for a demonstration that full pooling can be an optimal solution
when the discount factor is su¢ ciently high and when there is no commitment. This result
is due to the fact that, under no-commitment, the possibilities of rent transfers between the
periods are limited.
17
Proof. See Hosios and Peters (1989).
This result implies that the insurer does not have full information on the
risk types at the end of the rst period; therefore, accidents reports become
informative on the risk type contrary to the Cooper and Hayes model. However,
the authors did not discuss the optimality of such two-period contract. It is not
clear that a sequence of one-period contracts with separating equilibrium does
not dominate their sequence of contracts.
4 Competitive contracts
We now introduce a competitive context. Competition raises many new issues
in both static and dynamic environments. The two main issues that will be
discussed here are 1) the choice of an adequate equilibrium concept and the
study of its existence and e¢ ciency properties, and 2) the nature of information
between competitive insurers (and consequently the role of government in facil-
itating the transmission of information between insurance market participants,
particularly in long-term relationships).
It will be shown that many well-known and standard results are a function
of the assumption on how the insurers share the information about both the
individuals choice of contracts and accident experience.
In a rst step, the situation where no asymmetric information a¤ects the
insurance market is presented as a benchmark. After that, issues raised by
adverse selection problem and the remedies to circumvent it are discussed.
4.1 Public information about an individuals characteris-
tics
In a competitive market where insurance rms are able to discriminate among
the consumers according their riskiness, we would expect insureds to be o¤ered
a menu of policies with a complete coverage among which they choose the one
that corresponds with their intrinsic risk. Indeed, under competition, rms are
now constrained to earn zero expected prots. When information on individual
risk characteristics is public, each rm knows the risk type of each individual.
The optimal individual contract is the solution to:
Problem 2
Max
i;i;i
piU(W  D+i)+(1 pi)U(W  i)+i[(1 pi)i pii]; i = H;L
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where (1  pi)i = pii is the zero-prot constraint.
As for the monopoly case under public information, the solution to Problem
2 yields full insurance coverage for each type of risk. However, contrary to a
monopoly, the optimal solutions CH and C

L in Figure 3 correspond to levels of
consumer welfare greater than in the no-insurance situation (C0). As already
pointed out, the monopoly solution under public information also yields full
insurance coverage and does not introduce any distortion in risk allocation. The
di¤erence between the monopoly and competitive cases is that in the former,
consumer surplus is extracted by the insurer, while in the latter it is retained
by both types of policyholder.
Under competition, a zero-prot line passes through C0 and represents the
set of policies for which a type i consumers expected costs are nil for insurers.
The value of its slope is equal to the (absolute) ratio 1 pipi : Each point on the
segment [C0Ci ] has the same expected wealth for an individual of type i than
that corresponding to C0: The full information solutions are obtained when the
ratio of slopes of indi¤erence curves is just equal to the ratio of the probability
of not having an accident to that of having an accident. To sum up,
Proposition 6 In an insurance world of public information about insureds
riskiness, a one-period optimal contract between any competitive rm on market
and any individual of type i (i = H;L) is characterized by:
a) full insurance coverage, i = D   i
b) no rm makes a surplus,  (Ci j pi) = 0
c) consumers receive a surplus V (Ci j pi) > V
 
C0 j pi

:
Characteristic b) expresses the fact that premiums are set to marginal costs
and characteristic c) explains why individual participation constraints (2) are
automatically satised in a competitive context. Consequently, introducing
competitive actuarial insurance eliminates the wealth variance at the same mean
or corresponds to a mean preserving contraction.
Insert Figure 3 here.
Under perfect information, competition leads to one-period solutions that
are rst-best e¢ cient. This result does not hold when we introduce asymmetric
information.
4.2 Private information and single-period contracts
In the presence of adverse selection, the introduction of competition may lead
to fundamental problems with the existence and the e¢ ciency of an equilib-
rium. When insurance rms cannot distinguish among di¤erent risk types, they
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lose money by o¤ering the set of full information contracts (CH ; C

L) described
above, because both types will select CL (the latter contract requires a premium
lower than CH and in counterpart, also fully covers the incurring losses). Each
insurer will make losses because the average cost is greater than the premium
of CL; which is the expected cost of group L. Under asymmetric information,
traditional full information competitive contracts are not adequate to allocate
risk optimally. Consequently, many authors have investigated the role of sort-
ing devices in a competitive environment to circumvent this problem of adverse
selection. The rst contributions on the subject in competitive markets are by
Akerlof (1970), Spence (1974), Pauly (1974), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and
Wilson (1977). The literature on competitive markets is now very large; it is
not our intention here to review all contributions. Our selection of models was
based on criteria that will be identied and explained at an appropriate point.18
A rst division that we can make is between models of signaling (informed
agents move rst) and of screening (uninformed agents move rst) (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1984). Spence (1974) and Cho and Kreps (1987) models are of the rst
type and are mainly applied to labor markets in which the workers (informed
agents) move rst by choosing an education level (signal). Then employers
bid for the services of the workers and the latter select the more preferred
bids. Cho and Kreps (1987) present conditions under which this three-stage
game generates a Riley (1979a) single-period separating equilibrium.19 Without
restrictions (or criteria such as those proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987)) on
out-of-equilibrium beliefs, many equilibria arise simultaneously, which limit the
explanatory power of the traditional signaling models considerably.20
Although it may be possible to nd interpretations of the signaling models
in insurance markets, it is generally accepted that the screening interpretation
is more natural. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) introduced
insurance models with a screening behavior. In Rothschild and Stiglitzs model
only a two-stage game is considered. First, the uninformed insurer o¤ers a menu
of contracts to the informed customers, who choose among the contracts in the
second stage.
Let us start with Rothschild and Stiglitzs (1976) model in which the insurers
set premia with constant marginal costs. Each insurer knows the proportions of
good risks and bad risks in the market but has no information on an individuals
type. Moreover, each insurer cannot, by assumption, buy insurance from many
18See Cresta (1984) and Eisen (1989) for other analyses of problems of equilibria with
asymmetric information.
19A Riley or reactive equilibrium leads to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium
regardless of the number of individuals in each class of risk.
20Multiple equilibria are the rule in two-stage signaling models. However, when such equi-
libria are studied, the problem is to nd at least one that is stable and dominates in terms of
welfare. For a more detailed analysis of signaling models see the survey by Kreps (1989). On
the notion of sequential equilibrium and on the importance of consistency in beliefs see Kreps
and Wilson (1982).
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insurers. Otherwise, the individual insurers would not be able to observe the
individuals total amount of insurance and would not be able to discriminate
easily.21 Each insurer observes all o¤ers in the market. Finally, the insurer only
needs to observe the claims he receives.22
Clearly, the properties of the equilibrium depend on how rms react to rival
o¤ers. In a competitive environment, it seems reasonable to assume that each
insurer takes the actions of its rivals as given. The basic model by Rothschild
and Stiglitz described in the following lines considers that rms adopt a (pure)
Nash strategy. A menu of contracts in an insurance market is an equilibrium in
the Rothschild and Stiglitz sense if a) no contract in the equilibrium set makes
negative expected prots and b) there is no other contract added to the original
set that earns positive expected prots.
Under this denition of the equilibrium, Rothschild and Stiglitz obtained
three signicant results:
Proposition 7 When insurers follow a pure Cournot-Nash strategy in a two-
stage screening game:
a) A pooling equilibrium is not possible; the only possible equilibria are sep-
arating contracts.
b) A separating equilibrium may not exist.
c) The equilibrium, when it exists, is not necessarily a second-best optimum.
A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which both types of risk buy the
same contract. The publicly observable proportions of good-risk and bad-risk
individuals are respectively qL and qH (with qH + qL = 1) and the average
probability of having an accident is p. This corresponds to line C0F in Figure
4a. To see why the Nash denition of equilibrium is not compatible with a
pooling contract, assume that C1 in the gure is a pooling equilibrium contract
for a given insurer. By denition, it corresponds to zero aggregate expected
prots; otherwise, another insurer in the market will o¤er another pooling con-
tract. Because of the relative slopes of the risk type indi¤erence curves, there
always exists a contract C2 that will be preferred to contract C1 by the low-risk
individuals. The existence of contract C2 contradicts the above denition of a
Nash equilibrium. Consequently, if there exists an equilibrium, it has to be a
separating one in which di¤erent risk-type consumers receive di¤erent insurance
contracts.
21Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988) analyze the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
Specically, they specify the conditions under which an equilibrium exists when the sharing
of information about customers is treated endogenously as part of the game among rms.
They also contend that it is possible to overcome Rothschild-Stiglitzs existence problem of an
equilibrium if insureds cannot buy more than one contract. Finally, Hellwig (1988) maintains
that the resulting equilibrium is more akin to the Wilson anticipatory equilibrium than to the
competitive Nash equilibrium.
22This is a consequence of the exclusivity assumption. Because we consider static contracts,
observing accidents or claims does not matter. This conclusion will not necessarily be true in
dynamic models.
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Insert Figure 4a here.
Insert Figure 4b here.
As for the monopoly case, the formal solution is obtained by adding to Prob-
lem 2 one self-selection constraint (3) that guarantees that individual i prefers
Ci to Cj . By a similar argumentation to the one used in the determination of
the optimal solution in the monopoly situation, it can be shown that only the
self-selection constraint of the H risk type is binding at full insurance. Again
the prot constraint is binding on each type so the problem is limited to nd-
ing an optimal contract to the low-risk individual because that of the high-risk
individual corresponds to the full information case (H = 

H = D   H):
Problem 3
Max
L;L;L;HL
pLU(W  D + L) + (1  pL)U(W   L)
subject to the zero-prot constraint
(1  pL)L = pLL
and the self-selection constraint
U(W   H ) = pHU(W  D + L) + (1  pH)U(W   L):
At equilibrium, high-risk individuals receive full insurance because the low-
risk self-selection constraint is not binding. The solution of Problem 3 implies
that the low-risk type receives less than full insurance.23 We can summarize the
description of the separating equilibrium with the following proposition:
Proposition 8 In the presence of private information, an optimal menu of
separating one-period contracts between a competitive insurer and individuals of
types H and L has the following characteristics:
a) H = D   H ; L < D   L
b) V (Ci j pi) > V (C0 j pi) i = H;L
c) V (CH j pH) = V (CL j pH); V (CL j pL) > V (CH j pL):
Graphically, CH and C

L in Figure 4b correspond to a separating equi-
librium. In equilibrium, high-risk individuals buy full insurance (CH ); while
23Partial coverage is generally interpreted as a monetary deductible. However, in many
insurance markets the insurance coverage is excluded during a probationary period that can
be interpreted as a sorting device. Fluet (1992) analyzed the selection of an optimal time-
deductible in the presence of adverse selection.
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low-risk individuals get only partial insurance CL :
24 Each rm earns zero
expected prot on each contract. This equilibrium has the advantage for the
low-risk agents that their equilibrium premium corresponds to their actuarial
risk and does not contain any subsidy to the high-risk individuals. However,
a cost is borne by low-risk insureds in that their equilibrium contract delivers
only partial insurance compared with full insurance in the full information case.
Only high-risk individuals receive the rst-best allocation. Finally, the sepa-
rating equilibrium is not necessarily second-best optimal when it is possible to
improve the welfare of individuals in each class of risk. We will revisit this issue.
The second important result from Rothschild and Stiglitz is that there are
conditions under which a separating equilibrium does not exist. In general,
there is no equilibrium if the costs of pooling are low for the low-risk individuals
(few high-risk individuals or low qH ; which is not the case in Figure 4b becaue
the line C0F 0 corresponds to a value of qH higher than the critical level qRSH
permitting separating equilibria) or if the costs of separating are high (structure
of preference). In the former case, given the separating contracts, the cost of
sorting (partial insurance) exceeds the benets (no subsidy) when protable
pooling opportunities exist. As already shown, however, a pooling contract
cannot be an equilibrium. This negative result has prompted further theoretical
investigations given that many insurance markets function even in the presence
of adverse selection.
One extension of the existence of an equilibrium is to consider a mixed
strategy in which an insurers strategy is a probability distribution over a pair of
contracts. Rosenthal and Weiss (1984) show that a separating Nash equilibrium
always exists when the insurers adopt this strategy. However, it is not clear that
such a strategy has any particular economic interpretation in insurance markets
unlike in many other markets.25 Another extension is to introduce a three-stage
game in which the insurer may reject in the third stage the insureds contract
choice made in the second stage. Hellwig (1986, 1987) shows that a pooling
contract may correspond to a sequential equilibrium of the three-stage game
or it can never be upset by a separating contract whenever pooling is Pareto
preferred. Contrary to the Rothschild and Stiglitz two-stage model, the three-
stage game always has a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. The most
plausible sequential equilibrium is pooling rather than sorting, while in a three-
stage game in signaling models (Cho and Kreps, 1987) it is the pooling rather
24On the relationship between the coverage obtained by a low-risk individual under
monopoly compared to that under the pure Nash competitive equilibrium, see Dahlby (1987).
It is shown, for example, that under constant absolute risk aversion, the coverage obtained
by a low-risk individual under monopoly is greater than, equal to, or less than that obtained
under competition because the monopolists expected prot on a policy purchased by low-risk
individuals is greater than, equal to, or less than its expected prot on the policy purchased
by high-risk individuals.
25See also Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1997). On random-
ization to improve market functioning in the presence of adverse selection see Garella (1989)
and Arnott and Stiglitz (1988).
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the separating equilibria that lack robustness. As pointed out by Hellwig (1987),
the conclusions are very sensitive to the details of game specication.26
Another type of extension that permits equilibria is to allow rms to consider
other rmsbehavior or reactions in their strategies and then to abandon the
Nash strategy in the two-stage game. For example, Wilson (1977) proposes an
anticipatory equilibrium concept where rms drop policies so that those remain-
ing (after other rms anticipated reactions) at least break even. By denition,
a Wilson equilibrium exists if no insurer can o¤er a policy such that this new
policy 1) yields nonnegative prots and 2) remains protable after other in-
surers have withdrawn all unprotable policies in reaction to the o¤er. The
resulting equilibrium (pooling or separation) always exists. A Wilson equilib-
rium corresponds to the Nash equilibrium when a separating equilibrium exists;
otherwise, it is a pooling equilibrium such as C1 in Figure 4a.27 Finally, we
may consider the Riley (1979) reactive equilibrium where competitive rms add
new contracts as reaction to entrants. This equilibrium always corresponds to
separating contracts.
Wilson also considers subsidization between policies, but Miyazaki (1977)
and Spence (1977) develop the idea more fully. They show how to improve
welfare of both classes of risk (or of all n classes of risk; Spence, 1977) with the
low-risk class subsidizing the high-risk class. Spence shows that, in a model in
which rms react (in the sense of Wilson) by dropping loss-making policies, an
equilibrium always exists. In all the above models, each of the contracts in the
menu is dened to permit the low-risk policyholders to signal their true risk.
The resulting equilibrium is a break-even portfolio of separating contracts, and
exists regardless of the relative value of qH . The separating solution has no
subsidy between policies when qH  qWMSH . More formally we have
Proposition 9 A Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) equilibrium exists regard-
less of the value of qH . When qH  qWMSH ; the WMS equilibrium corresponds
to the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium.
One such equilibrium (C3; C4) is presented in Figure 5 for the case of two risk
classes with cross-subsidization from the low to the high-risk group. The curve
denoted by frontier in Figure 5 is the zero aggregate transfers locus dened such
that the contract pairs yield balanced transfers between the risk-types, and the
subset (C3; Z) in bold is the set of contracts for the low-risk individuals that
are second-best e¢ cient. The derivation of the optimal contracts with transfers
is obtained by maximizing the following program:
26See also Fagart (1996a) for another specication of the game. She extends the work of
Rothschild and Stiglitz. Her paper presents a game where two principals compete for an
agent, when the agent has private information. By considering a certain type of uncertainty,
competition in markets with asymmetric information does not always imply a loss of e¢ ciency.
27See Grossman (1979) for an analysis of the Wilson type equilibrium with reactions of
insureds rather than reactions of sellers.
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Problem 4
Max
L;L;t;s
pLU(W  D + L   t) + (1  pL)U(W   L   t)
subject to the non-negative aggregate prot constraint
qLt  qHs
the zero-prot constraint before cross-subsidization
(1  pL)L  pLL
the self-selection constraint
U(W   H + s)  pHU(W  D + L   t) + (1  pH)U(W   L   t)
the positivity constraint
s  0
where s and t are for subsidy and tax respectively.
When the positivity constraint is binding, (C3; C4) corresponds to the Rothschild-
Stiglitz contracts (CH ; C

L ) without cross-subsidization. When the positivity
constraint holds with a strict inequality, the equilibrium involves subsidization
from low-risks to high-risks.28
The Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) equilibrium (C3; C4) solves this pro-
gram if (C3; C4) is second-best e¢ cient in the sense of Harris and Townsend
(1981). An allocation is second-best e¢ cient if it is Pareto-optimal within the
set of allocations that are feasible and the zero-prot constraint on the port-
folio.29 In competitive insurance markets, Crocker and Snow (1985) prove the
following proposition, which can be seen as an analogue with the welfare rst
theorem (Henriet and Rochet, 1991):
Proposition 10 A Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) equilibrium is second-best
e¢ cient for all values of qH :
Proof. See Crocker and Snow (1985).
Subsidization between di¤erent risk classes is of special interest for char-
acterizing the notion of second-best optimality and simultaneously the shape
of optimal redistribution in insurance markets. Indeed, the optimal allocation
on these markets (given the incentive constraints imposed by adverse selection)
involves cross-subsidization between risk types. Thus, the second-best e¢ cient
28For a proof that the equilibrium can never imply subsidization from high-risk individuals
to low-risk individuals, see Crocker and Snow (1985).
29See Crocker and Snow (1985,1986) for more details. See Lacker and Weinberg (1999) for
a proof that a Wilson allocation is coalition proof.
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contracts resulting from this redistribution are described for low-risk individu-
als by the frontier in bold in Figure 5 (see Crocker and Snow, 1985). It can be
shown that a Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium is second-best e¢ cient if and
only if qH is higher than some critical value qWMSH ;
30 which is itself higher than
the critical value qRSH permitting the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Then, as
mentioned, a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily e¢ cient. The same conclusion
applies to the Riley equilibrium because it sustains the Rothschild and Stiglitz
solution, regardless of the value of qH : In the income-states space, the shape of
this curve can be convex as shown in Figure 5 (Dionne and Fombaron, 1996)
under some unrestrictive assumptions about utility functions. More precisely,
some conditions about risk aversion and prudence indexes guarantee the strict
convexity of the e¢ ciency frontier: the insurance coverage L o¤ered to low-
risks is a convex function in the subscribed premium L. High-risks are o¤ered
a coverage H which is a linear function in the premium H . It is shown by
Dionne and Fombaron (1996) that this frontier can never be strictly concave
under risk aversion. At least a portion of the frontier must be convex.31
Insert Figure 5 here.
Despite the presence of non-convexities of this locus in the income-states
space, the correspondence between optimality and market equilibrium is main-
tained (see Prescott and Townsend, 1984, for a general proof of this assertion,
and Henriet and Rochet, 1986, for an analysis in an insurance context). Conse-
quently, the conventional question about the possibility of achieving a second-
best e¢ cient allocation by a decentralized market does not arise. An analogue
to the second optimality theorem holds for an informationally constrained in-
surance market (Henriet and Rochet, 1986): even though government cannot a
priori impose risk-discriminating taxes on individuals, it can impose a tax on
their contracts and thus generate the same e¤ect as if taxing individuals directly
(Crocker and Snow, 1986).
Another attempt of introducing some form of dynamics in a non-cooperative
model was made by Asheim and Nilssen (1996). Their model allows insurers to
make a second move after having observed the contracts that their applicants
initially sign, under the restriction that this renegotiation is non-discriminating
(a contract menu o¤ered by an insurer to one of its customers has to be o¤ered
to all its customers). Such non-discriminating renegotiation weakens the prof-
itability of cream-skimming, to the extent that the unique (renegotiation-proof)
equilibrium of the game is the WMS outcome.
30On the relationship between risk aversion and the critical proportion of high-risks so
that the Rothschild/Stiglitz equilibrium is second-best e¢ cient, see Crocker and Snow (2008).
Their analysis shows that, when the utility function U becomes more risk averse, the critical
value of high-risks increases if U exhibits nonincreasing absolute risk aversion.
31For more general utility functions, the curvature can be both convex and concave in
the premium but must necessarily be convex around the full insurance allocation under risk
aversion. For more details, see Pannequin (1992) and Dionne and Fombaron (1996).
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In contrast, Inderst and Wambach (2001) solve the non-existence problem
by considering rms which face capacity constraints (due to limited capital for
instance). Under the constraint that no single insurer can serve the whole market
(implying that a deviating rm with a pooling contract cannot be assured of a
fair risk selection), each customer receives in equilibrium his Rothschild-Stiglitz
contract. However, the equilibrium is not unique. The same conclusion prevails
if, instead of capacity constraints, the authors assume that rms face the risk
of bankruptcy (or they are submitted to solvency regulation). In both contexts,
more customers can make each policy less attractive to a potential insured.
Finally, as we will see in Section 7, another possibility to deal with equi-
librium issues is to use risk categorization (see Crocker and Snow, 2012, and
Dionne and Rothschild, 2011, for more detailed analyzes).
4.3 Multiperiod contracts and competition
The aspect of competition raises new technical and economic issues on mul-
tiperiod contracting. Indeed, the value of information a¤ects the process of
decision-making in a competitive insurance market considerably. Let us be-
gin with Cooper and Hayes (1987) analysis of two-period contracts with full
commitment on the supply side.
4.3.1 Full commitment
Cooper and Hayes use the Nash equilibrium concept in a two-period game where
the equilibrium must be separating.32 They consider two di¤erent behaviors re-
lated to commitment on the demand side. First, both insurers and insureds
commit themselves to the two-period contracts (without possibility of renegoti-
ation) and second, the insurers commit to a two-period contract but the contract
is not binding on insureds. We will refer these respective situations as contracts
with full commitment and with semi-commitment, respectively. When compet-
itive rms can bind agents to the two periods, it is easy to show that, in the
separating solution, the contracts o¤ered are qualitatively identical to that of
the monopoly solution with commitment: high-risk agents receive full insurance
at an actuarial price in each period while low-risk agents face price and quantity
adjustments in the second period. Suppose that qH is such that a Rothschild
and Stiglitz equilibrium is second-best e¢ cient. It can be shown that the two-
period contract with full commitment dominates a repetition of Rothschild and
Stiglitz contracts without memory. As for the monopoly case, this result is due
32 In other words, they implicitly assume that the conditions to obtain a Nash separating
equilibrium in a single-period contract are su¢ cient for an equilibrium to exist in their two-
period model.
27
to the memory e¤ect (see Chiappori et al, 1994 for a survey on the memory
e¤ect).
When the authors relax the strong commitment assumption in favor of semi-
commitment, and consider that insureds can costlessly switch to other rms in
the second period, they show that the presence of second-period competition
limits but does not destroy the use of experience rating as a sorting device. The
di¤erence between the results with full commitment and semi-commitment is
explained by the fact that the punishment possibilities for period-one accidents
are reduced by the presence of other rms that o¤er single-period contracts in
the second period.
The semi-commitment result was obtained by assuming that, in the sec-
ond period, entrant rms o¤er single-period contracts without any knowledge
of insureds accident histories or their choice of contract in the rst period.
The new rmsoptimal behavior is to o¤er Rothschild and Stiglitz separating
contracts33 to the market.34 By taking this decision as given, the design of
the optimal two-period contract by competitive rms with semi-commitment
has to take into account at least one supplementary binding constraint (no-
switching constraint) that reduces social welfare compared to full commitment.
The formal problem consists of maximizing the low-riskstwo-period expected
utility by choosing C2H and C
2
L under the incentive compatibility constraints,
the nonnegative intertemporal expected prot constraint and the no-switching
constraints:
Problem 5
max
C2H ;C
2
L
V (C2L j pL)
s:t:
V (C2i j pi)  V (C2j j pi) i; j = H;L; i 6= j
(CL j pL) + [pL(CLa j pL) + (1  pL)(CLn j pL)]  0
V (Cis j pi)  V (Ci j pi) i = H;L s = a; n:
By the constraint of non-negative expected prots earned on the low-risks
multiperiod contract, this model rules out the possibility of insurerso¤ering
cross-subsidizations between the low and the high-risks (and circumvent any
problems of inexistence of Nash equilibrium). Because this constraint is ob-
viously binding at the optimum, Cooper and Hayes allow only intertemporal
transfers.
Using the above model, Cooper and Hayes proved the following results, sum-
marized by Proposition 11:
33The Rothschild and Stiglitz contracts are not necessarily the best policy rival rms can
o¤er. Assuming that outside options are xed is restrictive. This issue is discussed in the next
section.
34The authors limited their focus to separating solutions.
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Proposition 11 Under the assumption that a Nash equilibrium exists, the opti-
mal two-period contract with semi-commitment is characterized by the following
properties:
1) High-risk individuals obtain full insurance coverage and are not experience
rated: V (CHa j pH) = V (CHn j pH) = V (CH j pH) = U(W   H);
while low-risk individuals receive only partial insurance coverage and are
experience rated: V (CLa j pL) < V (CLn j pL);
2) High-risk agents are indi¤erent between their contract and that intended
for low-risks, while low-risks strictly prefer their contract:
V (C2H j pH) = V (C2L j pH) and V (C2L j pL) > V (C2H j pL);
3) Both high and low-risks obtain a consumer surplus:
V (C2i j pi) > 2V (C0 j pi); i = H;L;
4) The pattern of temporal prots is highballing on low-riskscontracts and
at on high-risksones:
(CL j pL)  0  [pL(CLa j pL) + (1  pL)(CLn j pL)]
and (CH j pH) = (CHa j pH) = (CHn j pH) = 0.
In other words, the presence of competition, combined with the agentsin-
ability to enforce binding multiperiod contracts, reduces the usefulness of long
term contracts as a sorting device and consequently, the potential gains of long
term relationships. This conclusion is similar to that obtained in the monopoly
case (in which the principal cannot commit on nonrenegotiation) because the
no-switching constraints imposed by competition can be reinterpreted as ratio-
nality constraints in a monopolistic situation.
The fourth property in Proposition 11 means that, at equilibrium, rms
make positive expected prots on old low-risk insureds (by earning positive
prots on the low-risksrst period contract) and expected losses on new low-
risk insureds (by making losses on the second-period contract of low-risks who
su¤ered a rst-period loss, greater than positive prots on the low-riskscontract
corresponding to the no-loss state in the rst period). In aggregate, expected
two-period prots from low-risks are zero.
As in the monopoly situation, all the consumers self-select in the rst pe-
riod and only low-risk insureds are o¤ered an experience-rated contract in the
second period based on their accident history.35 This arrangement provides an
appropriate bonus for accident-free experience and ensures that low-risks who
su¤er an accident remain with the rm.36 This temporal prot pattern, also
called highballing by DArcy and Doherty (1990), was shown to contrast with
35But not on their contract choice.
36The corresponding expected utility of the low-risk individual who did not have an accident
in the rst period is strictly greater at equilibrium than that corresponding to the entrant
one-period contract.
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the lowballing predicted in dynamic models without commitment. In particular,
DArcy and Doherty compare the results obtained by Cooper and Hayes under
the full commitment assumption with those of the lowballing predicted by Kun-
reuther and Pauly (1985) in a price competition. With similar assumptions on
commitment, Nilssen (1990) also obtains a lowballing prediction in the classic
situation of competition in price-quantity contracts.
Although Cooper and Hayes were the rst to consider a repeated insurance
problem with adverse selection and full commitment, some assumptions are not
realistic, namely the insurersability to commit to long term relationships. In-
deed, because the rst-period contract choices do reveal the individual risks,
the initial agreement on the second-period contract could be renegotiated at
the beginning of the second period (under full information) in a way that would
improve the welfare of both parties. Consequently, the two-period contract
with full commitment is Pareto-ine¢ cient ex post, i.e. relative to the informa-
tion acquired by insurers at that time. Recent articles in the literature have
investigated other concepts of relationships between an insurer and its insureds,
involving limited commitment: the no-commitment assumption represents the
polar case of the full commitment situation (section 4.3.2) and the commitment
with renegotiation appears to be an intermediate case between full commitment
and no-commitment (section 4.3.3).
As a result of the strong hypotheses above, the literature obtains the same
predictions as in the static model about the equilibrium existence issue37 and
about the self-selection principle. These predictions do not hold any longer
when we assume limited commitment and/or endogenous outside options.
4.3.2 No-commitment
In this section, the attention is paid to competitive insurance models in which
the contractual parties can commit only to one-period incentive schemes, i.e.
where insurers can write short-term contracts, but not long-term contracts.
The no-commitment is bilateral in the sense that each insured can switch to
another company in period two if he decides to do so. Such situations are
particularly relevant in liability insurance (automobile or health insurance for
example) where long-term contracts are rarely signed. Despite this inability to
commit, both parties can sign a rst-period contract that should be followed
by second-period contracts that are conditionally optimal and experience-rated.
This sequence of one-period contracts gives rise to a level of intertemporal wel-
fare lower than that of full commitment, but, in some cases, higher than in a
repetition of static contracts without memory.
37Cross-subsidizations between risk types remain inconsistent with equilibrium, such that
problems for equilibrium existence also exist in a multiperiod context.
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Kunreuther and Pauly (1985) were the rst to study a multiperiod model
without commitment in a competitive insurance context. However, their in-
vestigation is not really an extension of the Rothschild and Stiglitz analysis
because the authors consider competition in price and not in price-quantity.38
They argue that insurers are unable to write exclusive contracts; instead they
propose that insurers o¤er pure price contracts only (Pauly, 1974). They also
assume that consumers are myopic: they choose the rm that makes the most
attractive o¤er in the current period. At the other extreme, the classic dynamic
literature supposes that individuals have perfect foresight in the sense that they
maximize the discounted expected utility over the planning horizon.
Despite the major di¤erence in the assumption about the way insurers com-
pete, their model leads to the same lowballing prediction as other studies, like
the one developed by Nilssen (1990), using the basic framework of the Rothschild
and Stiglitz model where rms compete by o¤ering price-quantity contracts. In-
surers make expected losses in the rst period and earn expected prots on the
policies they renew. This prediction of lock-in is due to the assumption that
insurers do not write long-term contracts while, as we saw, Cooper and Hayes
permitted long-term contracting. In Nilssens model, an important result is to
show that pooling contracts could emerge in dynamic equilibrium (pooling on
the new insureds) when the ability to commit lacks in the relationships, which
makes the cross-subsidizations compatible with equilibrium. Contrary to the
Kunreuther and Pauly model, the absence of commitment does not rule out
separation.
The program presented below (Problem 6) includes Nilssens model as a
particular case (more precisely, for both xH = 1; xL = 0 where xi 2 [0; 1] mea-
sures the level of separation of type i). In other words, we introduce strategies
played by insureds in Nilssens model, such that at equilibrium, semi-pooling
can emerge in the rst period, followed by separation in the second period. This
technical process, also labeled randomization, serves to defer the revelation of
information and thus encourages compliance with sequential optimality con-
straints required by models with limited commitment. It was used by Hosios
and Peters (1989), as we saw, in a monopoly situation without commitment and
by Dionne and Doherty (1994) in a competitive context with commitment and
renegotiation.39
Solving the two-period model without commitment requires the use of the
concept of Nash Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (NPBE).40 Given this notion of
sequential equilibrium, we work backwards and begin by providing a description
of the Nash equilibrium in the last period.
38They let insurers o¤er contracts specifying a per-unit premium for a given amount of
coverage.
39On limited commitment and randomized strategies, see also Dionne and Fluet (2000).
40This concept implies that the set of strategies satises sequential rationality given the
system of beliefs, and that the system of beliefs is obtained from both strategies and observed
actions using Bayesrule whenever possible.
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In period 2, dCia and dCin solve the following subprograms imposed by the
constraints of sequential optimality, for s 2 fa; ng respectively where a means
accident in the rst period and n means no-accident:
Problem 6
cCis 2 argmax P
i=H;L
qis(xi)(Cis j pi)
s:t:
V (Cis j pi)  V (Cjs j pi) i; j = H;L; i 6= j
V (Cis j pi)  V (CRSi j pi) i = H;L
where posterior beliefs41 are dened by
qia(xi) =
qipixiP
k=H;L
qkpkxk
and qin(xi) =
qi(1  pi)xiP
k=H;L
qk(1  pk)xk ; i = H;L:
For given beliefs, the second-period optimization subprogram is similar, in
some sense, to a single-period monopoly insurance model with adverse selection
(Stiglitz 1977, in section 3.2) for a subgroup of insureds and where no-switching
constraints correspond to usual participation constraints. In the absence of
commitment and because of informational asymmetries between insurers, each
informed rm can use its knowledge of its old insureds to earn positive prots
in the second period. However, this prot is limited by the possibility that
old insureds switch to another company at the beginning of the second period.
Contrary to a rival company, a rm that proposes sets of contracts in the second
period to its insureds can distinguish among accident-groups on the basis of
past accident observations. Each company acquires over time an informational
advantage relative to the rest of competing rms on the insurance market.
The PBE of the complete game is a sequence of one-period contracts (Ci ; C

ia; C

in)
for every i = H;L, such that:
Problem 7
(Ci ; C

ia; C

in) 2 argmax
(Ci;Cia;Cin)
V (CL j pL)+[pLV (dCLa j pL)+(1 pL)V (dCLn j pL)]
s:t:
xi(1 + )V (C
RS
i jpi) + (1  xi)[V (Cijpi) + (piV (dCiajpi) + (1  pi)V (dCinjpi))]
 V (Cj jpi) + (piV (dCjajpi) + (1  pi)V (dCjnjpi))
41Put di¤erently, qia(xi) and qin(xi) are the probabilities at the beginning of the second
period that, among the insureds having chosen the pooling contract in the rst period, an
insured belongs to the i-risk class if he has su¤ered a loss or no loss in the rst period
respectively.
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X
i=H;L
qi(xi)(Cijpi) + [
X
i=H;L
qia(xi)(dCiajpi) + X
i=H;L
qin(xi)(dCinjpi)]  0
where dCLa;dCLn solve Problem 6 for s = a; n respectively.
Problem 7 provides the predictions summarized in Proposition 12.
Proposition 12 In the presence of private information, each company may in-
crease the individuals welfare by o¤ering two contracts, a sequence of one-period
contracts and a multiperiod contract without commitment with the following
characteristics:
1) Both high and low-risk classes obtain partial insurance coverage in each
period and are experience rated: V (Cia j pi)  V (Cin j pi); i = H;L;
2) High-risk classes are indi¤erent between a mix of a sequence of Roth-
schild Stiglitz contracts and the multiperiod contract, also subscribed by low-risk
individuals:
xH(1 + )V (C
RS
H j pH) + (1  xH)V (C2H j pH) = V (C2L j pH)
and the low-risks strictly prefer the multiperiod contract:
V (C2L j pL) > xL(1 + )V (CRSL j pL) + (1  xL)V (C2L j pL); xL 2 [0; 1];
3) High and low-risk individuals obtain a consumer surplus:
V (C2i j pi) > (1 + )V (C0 j pi); i = H;L;
4) Aggregate expected prots earned on the multiperiod contract increase over
time:
P
i=H;L
qi(xi)(C

i j pi) <
P
i=H;L
P
s=a;n
qis(xi)(C

is j pi):
Concerning the existence property, it can be shown that a Nash Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium exists for some values of parameters (i.e. for every qH
such that qH  qNCH (> qRSH ) where NC is for no commitment). As a conse-
quence, the existence property of equilibrium is guaranteed for a set of para-
meters smaller than in the static model. More importantly, this model exhibits
a lowballing conguration of intertemporal prots (increasing prots over time;
each rm earns a positive expected prot on its old customers because it con-
trols information on past experience42), contrary to the highballing prediction
resulting from models with full commitment.
Finally, particular attention could be paid to interrm communication and
the model could make the outside options endogenous to the information re-
vealed over time. In Cooper and Hayesand Nilssens models and in most dy-
namic models, rms are supposed to o¤er the same contract to a new customer
42Cromb (1990) considered the e¤ects of di¤erent precommitment assumptions between the
parties to the contract on the value of accident history. Under fully binding contracts, the
terms of the contract depend only on the number of accidents over a certain time horizon,
while under other assumptions (partially binding and no binding) the timing of accidents
becomes important.
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(the outside option is CRSi ), whatever his contractual path and his accident
history. In other words, it is implicitly assumed that the information revealed
by the accident records and by contractual choices does not become public.43
However, this assumption is not very realistic with regard to the presence, in
some countries, of a specic regulatory law that obliges insurers to make these
data public.44 This is the case in France and in most European countries for
automobile insurance, where the free availability of accident records is a statu-
tory situation. Consequently, models with endogenous outside options would
be more appropriate to describe the functioning of the competitive insurance
market in these countries. To evaluate the e¤ects of a regulatory law about
interrm communication, let us consider the extreme situation in which insur-
ers are constrained to make data records public, such that rival rms do have
free access to all accident records. Formally, this amounts to replacing CRSi by
Ccci in no-switching constraints of Problem 6 (C
cc
i is the best contract a rival
uninformed company can o¤er to i-risk type at the beginning of period 2).
In other words, Ccci describes the switching opportunities of any insured
i and depends on xi). At one extreme case, when the rst-period contracts
are fully separating, the contract choice reveals individual risk-types to any in-
surer on the insurance market, and Ccci will be the rst-best contract C
FB
i :
If competing rms have identical knowledge about insureds risks over time,
no experience rating is sustainable in equilibrium and allocative ine¢ ciency
results from dynamic contractual relationships. The "too large" amount of re-
vealed information destroys e¢ ciency and eliminates dynamic equilibria. In
contrast, when rival rms do not have access to accident records, equilibrium
involves experience-rating and dynamic contracts achieve second-best optimal-
ity, because informational asymmetries between competing rms make cross-
subsidization compatible with the Nash equilibrium. As a consequence, insureds
are always better o¤ when accidents remain private information.45 The next
section is devoted to an analysis of multiperiod contracts under an intermediary
level of commitment from insurers.
4.4 Commitment and renegotiation
Dionne and Doherty (1994) introduced the concept of renegotiation in long-
term relationships in insurance markets. Here, the two-period contracts are
considered where insureds can leave the relation at the end of the rst period
and the insurer is bound by a multiperiod agreement. It di¤ers from Cooper and
Hayesmodel since the possibility of renegotiation. Indeed, insurers are allowed
43When an individual quits a company A and begins a new relationship with a company B,
he is considered by the latter as a new customer on the insurance market.
44For a more detailed argumentation of information sharing, see Kunreuther and Pauly
(1985), DArcy and Doherty (1990), and Dionne (2001).
45 In a context of symmetric imperfect information (see section 7.3), de Garidel (2005) also
nds that accident claims should not be shared by insurers.
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to make a proposition of contract renegotiation with their insureds which can
be accepted or rejected. In other words, parties cannot precommit to not make
Pareto-improving changes based on information revealed at the end of the rst
period. As shown in Dionne and Doherty (1994), the Cooper and Hayessolution
is not renegotiation-proof. This means that sequential optimality fails because
partiesobjectives change over time. If renegotiation cannot be ruled out, the
company and its insureds anticipate it, and this will change the nature of the
contracts. Thus, to ensure robustness against renegotiation procedure described
above, we must impose either the constraint of pooling in the rst period or the
constraint of full insurance for both types in the second period in addition to
standard constraints in Cooper and Hayes optimization program. The new
program can be written as Problem 7 except for the second-period constraints
imposed by sequential optimality. Indeed, renegotiation-proofness means that
the second-period contracts are robust to Pareto-improving changes and not
only for increasing the insurerswelfare. Consequently, second-period contracts
cannot be solved as a subprogram that maximizes insurersexpected prots. In
contrast, they must solve, in the last period, a standard competitive program
that optimizes the low-risks welfare (in each group a and n). Moreover, no-
switching constraints must appear in these subprograms in a similar way as in
the model without commitment.
If we consider a general model in which all kinds of transfers are allowed (in-
tertemporal and intertype transfers), problem 6 can be rewritten in the context
of semi-commitment with renegotiation as follows:
Problem 8
cCis 2 argmaxV (CLs j pL) for s = a; n
s:t:
V (Cis j pi)  V (Cjs j pi) i; j = H;L; i 6= jX
i=H;L
qis(xi)(Cis j pi)  s
V (Cis j pi)  V (CRSi j pi) i = H;L:
Dionne and Doherty (1994) rst show that fully separating strategies, once
made robust to renegotiation, degenerate to an outcome that amounts to that
of a replication of single-period contracts in terms of welfare, when insureds are
bound in relationships. If insureds are allowed to leave their company at the
end of period 1, the program includes, in addition, no-switching constraints. As
a result of this more constrained problem, the outcome will be worse in terms of
welfare relative to a sequence of static contracts without memory. This negative
result on separating contracts suggests e¢ ciency will be attained by a partial
revelation of information over time (as in the no-commitment model). Dionne
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and Doherty then show that the solution may involve semi-pooling in the rst
period followed by separated contracts. They argue that the equilibrium is fully
separating when the discount factor is low and tends to a pooling for large
discount factors. They also obtain a highballing conguration of intertempo-
ral prots, contrary to the lowballing prediction resulting from models without
commitment. Thus, commitment with renegotiation provides the same predic-
tions as those in Proposition 12 except for the fourth result, which becomes:P
i=H;L
qi(xi)(C

i j pi) >
P
i=H;L
P
s=a;n
qis(xi)(C

is j pi):
However, if a more general model is considered, in which outside options
are endogenous (in which case Ccci replace C
RS
i in Problem 8; i=H,L), the
conguration in equilibrium does not necessarily exhibit a decreasing prole of
intertemporal prots for the company, meaning that models with commitment
and renegotiation do not necessarily rule out the possibility of lock-in.46 As in
models without commitment, insureds are always better o¤ when the informa-
tion about accident records remains private, i.e. in a statutory situation where
no regulatory law requires companies to make record data public.
Finally, the issue of consumer lock-in and the pattern of temporal prots
should motivate researchers to undertake empirical investigations of the signif-
icance of adverse selection and of the testable predictions that permit discrim-
ination between the competing models. To our knowledge, only two published
studies have investigated these questions with multi-period data; their conclu-
sions go in opposite directions. DArcy and Doherty (1990) found evidence of
lowballing that supports the non-commitment assumption while Dionne and
Doherty (1994) report that a signicant group of insurers in California used
highballing   a result that is more in line with some form of commitment. It
is interesting to observe that this group of insurers attracts selective portfolios
with disproportionate numbers of low-risks. This result reinforces the idea that
some form of commitment introduces more e¢ ciency and the fact that there is
adverse selection in this market.
5 Moral hazard and adverse selection
Although in many situations principals face adverse selection and moral hazard
problems simultaneously when they design contracts, these two types of asym-
metric information have been given separate treatments so far in the economic
46However, it is possible to establish that a competitive insurance market always has an
equilibrium, due to the compatibility of cross-subsidization with equilibrium, as opposed to the
result in static models. The economic intuition is the following: an additional instrument can
serve to make rival o¤ers less attractive. It consists in informed insurerso¤ering unprotable
contracts in the second period. This instrument is possibly used in a case of commitment with
renegotiation but cannot be enforced in no-commitment situations.
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literature on risk-sharing agreements. Both information problems have been in-
tegrated into a single model where all the parties of the contract are risk neutral
(La¤ont and Tirole, 1986; Picard, 1987; Caillaud et al, 1988; Guesnerie et al,
1988). Although these models involve uncertainty, they are unable to explain
arrangements where at least one party is risk averse. In particular they do not
apply to insurance. More recently, some authors have attempted to integrate
both information problems into a single model where the agent is risk averse.
As discussed by Dionne and Lasserre (1988) such an integration of both
information problems is warranted on empirical grounds. Applied studies are
still few in this area, but researchers will nd it di¢ cult to avoid considering
both kinds of information asymmetry (see, however, Dionne, Michaud, and
Dahchour, 2010).
5.1 Monopoly and multi-period contracts
Dionne and Lasserre (1988) show how it is possible to achieve a second-best
allocation of risks when moral hazard and adverse selection problems exist si-
multaneously. While they draw heavily on the contributions of Rubinstein and
Yaari (1983), Dionne (1983) and Dionne and Lasserre (1985), the integration of
the two types of information problems is not a straightforward exercise. Given
that an agent who has made a false announcement may now choose an action
that is statistically compatible with his announcement, false announcements
may go undetected. They propose a contract under which the agent cannot
prot from this additional degree of freedom. Under a combination of moral
hazard and adverse selection, several types of customers can adopt di¤erent
care levels such that they have identical expected losses. When this happens,
it is impossible to distinguish those who produce an e¢ cient level of care from
the others on the basis of average losses.
However, deviant behaviors can be detected by monitoring deviations from
the mean. Thus the insurers strategy can be written with more than one simple
aggregate (as in Dionne and Lasserre, 1985, and Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983).
In Dionne and Lasserre (1988) the principal has to monitor two aggregates,
the average loss experienced by a given agent and its squared deviation from
the mean. It was su¢ cient to get the desired result because in their model the
information problem has only two dimensions. More generally, the insurer would
have to monitor one moment of the distribution for each hidden dimension.
Combining moral hazard with adverse selection problems in models that use
past experience might involve some synergetic e¤ects. In the model presented in
Dionne and Lasserre (1988), the same information required to eliminate either
the moral hazard problem alone (Rubinstein and Yaari) or adverse selection
alone (Dionne and Lasserre) is used to remove both problems simultaneously. A
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related subject concerns the e¢ cient use of past information, and the allocation
of instruments, toward the solution of each particular information problem. Self-
selection mechanisms have long been proposed in response to adverse selection
while nonlinear pricing was put forth as a solution to moral hazard. In one-
period contracts both procedures used separately involve ine¢ ciency (partial
insurance) which can be reduced by the introduction of time in the contracts.
Dionne and Lasserre show that self-selection may help solve both moral hazard
problems and adverse selection problems. We will now discuss how the use of two
instruments may improve resource allocation and welfare when both problems
are present simultaneously in single-period competitive contracts.
In a static model which can be considered as a special case of the Dionne
and Lasserres (1988) model, Chassagnon (1994) studies the optimality of a one-
period model when both problems are present simultaneously. Three results are
of interest in this paper: 1) the Spence-Mirlees propriety is not always veried.
Indi¤erence curves may have more than one intersection point; 2) contrarily
to the Stiglitz (1977) model where the low-risk individual may not have access
to any insurance coverage, in Chassagnons model, there are congurations (in
particular, the conguration du pas de danse, dance step) where all agents
obtain insurance; nally, 3) both types of agents may receive a positive rent
according to their relative number in the economy.
The model is specic in the sense that the accident probabilities keep the
same order when the e¤ort level is the same. Suppose that there are only two
levels of e¤orts that characterize the accident probabilities of type i: p
i
< pi;
i = H;L. In Chassagnons model, p
H
> p
L
and pH > pL while pH can be lower
than pL. In fact the e¤ect of introducing moral hazard in the pure principal-
agent model becomes interesting when the high-risk individual is more e¢ cient
at care activities than the low-risk individual. Otherwise, when p
H
> pL, the
results are the same as in the pure adverse selection selection model where only
the H type receives a positive rent.
5.2 Competitive contracts
One of the arguments often used to justify the prohibition of risk categorization
is that it is based on xed or exogenous characteristics such as age, race and sex.
However, as pointed out by Bond and Crocker (1990), insurers also use other
characteristics that are chosen by individuals. They extend Crocker and Snow
(1986) previous analysis of risk categorization in the presence of adverse selection
and examine the equilibrium and e¢ ciency implications of risk categorization
based on consumption goods that are statistically related to individuals risks,
which they termed correlative products.
Formally, their model introduces endogenous categorization in an environ-
ment characterized by both moral hazard and adverse selection. They show that
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while there is a natural tension between the sorting of risk classes engendered by
adverse selection and the correction of externalities induced by moral hazard,
the use of risk classication improves e¢ ciency in resource allocation. They
also obtain that the sorting of risks based on correlative consumption may give
a rst-best allocation as Nash equilibria when adverse selection is not too se-
vere, and when the insurer can observe individual consumption of the hazardous
good.
This is particularly interesting as an alternative view of how rms, in prac-
tice, may overcome the nonexistence of Nash equilibrium problems. They then
consider the case where the insurer cannot observe both the individuals con-
sumption and the individuals characteristics. However, the planner can observe
aggregate production of the good. They show that taxation of the consump-
tion good now has two roles (reducing moral hazard and relaxing self-selection
constraints) that permit Pareto improvements.
Cromb (1990) analyzes the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and ad-
verse selection in competitive insurance markets and concludes that the ad-
dition of moral hazard to the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model with
adverse selection has qualitative e¤ects on the nature and existence of equilib-
rium. Under certain circumstances the addition of moral hazard may eliminate
the adverse selection problem but, more generally, it constitutes a new source
of non-existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Chassagnon and Chiappori (1995) also propose an extension to the pure ad-
verse selection model to consider incentives or moral hazard: the individuals
probability of accidents is no longer completely exogenous; it depends on the
agents level of e¤ort. In general, di¤erent agents choose di¤erent e¤ort levels
even when facing the same insurance contract. The equilibrium e¤ort level does
not depend on the level of accident probability but on its derivative. Conse-
quently, the H type may have more incentive to produce safety to have access
to a low insurance premium but he may not have access to e¢ cient technology.
As in Chassagnon (1994), indi¤erence curves may intersect more than once
which rules out the Spence-Mirlees condition. As a result, when an equilib-
rium exists, it may correspond to many Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibria, a
situation that is ruled out in the pure adverse selection model. Consequently,
the equilibrium must be ranked, and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1995) use
Hahns concept of equilibrium to select the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium from
the Rothschild-Stiglitz candidates. In the pure adverse selection world, both
equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
In the same spirit, De Meza and Webb (2001) formalize the argument of
"advantageous selection" and examine the relation between risk preference and
choice of precaution with a specication that the taste-for-risk parameter is addi-
tive in wealth. Under this non-monetary formulation of the cost of prevention,
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the authors show that the single-crossing condition between risk-neutral and
risk-averse individuals may not be satised (while Jullien, Salanié and Salanié
(2007) show that this property always holds with a monetary formulation of the
cost of precaution).
As a starting point, cautious types (more inclined to buy insurance and
to put forth more e¤ort) initially coexist with risk-tolerant types (disinclined
to insure and to take precautions). The precautionary e¤ort is thus positively
correlated with insurance purchase. Depending on parameter values, separating,
full pooling and partial pooling equilibria are possible. What allows pooling
(partial or full) is the double crossing of indi¤erence curves.
Another important conclusion is about the condition to obtain an equilib-
rium. It was shown in a previous section that a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium
exists if and only if there are enough high-risk agents in the economy. When
both problems are present simultaneously, this condition is no longer true. De-
pending on the parameters of the model, an equilibrium may exist whatever the
proportions of agents of di¤erent types; or may even fail to exist whatever the
respective proportions.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the individual with higher accident
probability, at equilibrium, always has access to the more comprehensive insur-
ance coverage, a conclusion that is shared by the standard model. However,
here, this individual is not necessarily of type H. This result is important for
empirical research on the presence of asymmetric information problems.47
In contrast, several studies suggest that the correlation between risk level
and insurance purchases is ambiguous. The above-mentioned "advantageous
selection" is called "propitious selection" by De Donder and Hindriks (2009),
who also assume that applicants who are highly risk averse are more likely to
try to reduce the hazard and to purchase insurance. In a model with two types
of individuals di¤ering in risk aversion, two properties (regularity and single-
crossing) formalize the propitious argument. Under these two properties, the
more risk-averse individuals will both exert more precaution and have a higher
willingness to pay for insurance. De Donder and Hindriks (2009) thus prove that
there cannot exist a pooling equilibrium. Indeed, a deviating rm can always
propose a protable contract, attractive only for the more risk-averse agents
(who are also less risky in accordance with the propitious argument). Finally,
the equilibrium contracts are separating with the more risk-averse individuals
buying more insurance. Despite the propitious selection, the correlation between
risk levels and insurance purchases is ambiguous at equilibrium: even though
more risk averse agents behave more cautiously, they also buy more insurance
at equilibrium, and with moral hazard, risk increases with coverage.
47See Cohen and Siegelman (2010) for a survey and a discussion about empirical work on
the coveragerisk correlation that the pure asymmetric information model predicts. See also
Chiappori and Salanié (2012) for a more recent review of empirical models on asymmetric
information and Dionne, Michaud and Dahchour (2011) for a model that separates moral
hazard from adverse selection and learning.
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In a two-period model combining moral hazard and adverse selection, Son-
nenholzner and Wambach (2009) propose another explanation of why the rela-
tionship between level of risk and insurance coverage can be of any sign. They
stress the role of (unobservable) individual personal discount in explaining the
decision to purchase insurance. Impatient individuals (with a high discount fac-
tor) initially coexist with patient individuals (with a low discount factor). A
separating equilibrium exists in which patient consumers exert high precaution
and are partially covered with a prot-making insurance contract, while the
impatient consumers exert low e¤ort and buy a contract with lower coverage or
even prefer to remain uninsured. In contrast with the usual prediction, there is
a negative correlation between risk and quantity. 48 49
These works are very close to the literature on multi-dimensional adverse
selection where preferences are not necessarily single-crossing (See 7.2 in this
Chapter). However in these multi-dimensional models, the higher risks buy
more insurance.
6 Adverse selection when people can choose their
risk status
An interesting twist on the adverse selection problem is to allow the information
status of individuals to vary as well as the risk status. A traditional adverse
selection problem arises when individuals know their risk status but the insurer
does not. What will happen in a market where some insureds know their risk
status and others do not? The answer to this question depends on whether the
information status is observed by the insurer. A further variation arises when
the uninformed insureds can take a test to ascertain their risk status. Whether
they choose to take the test depends on the menu they will be o¤ered when they
become informed and how the utility of this menu compares with the utility of
remaining uninformed. Thus, the adverse selection problem becomes entwined
with the value of information.
These questions are especially important in the health care debate. Progress
in mapping the human genome is leading to more diagnostic tests and treatment
48Without loss of generality, Fombaron and Milcent (2007) obtain the same conclusion in a
model of health insurance in which they introduce a gap between the reservation utilities. This
formulation implies that the low-risks may be more inclined to buy insurance than the high-
risks when loss probabilities are symmetric information. This nding suggests that preference
heterogeneity may be su¢ cient in explaining the opposite selection of insurance coverage in
various markets.
49Cutler, Finkelstein and McGarry (2008) present empirical evidence in life insurance and
in long-term care insurance in the US that is consistent with this negative correlation (those
who have more insurance are lower risk because they produce more prevention). However, in
annuity markets for example, higher risk people seem to have more insurance, as the standard
theory would predict. See also Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang et al (2008).
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for genetic disorders. It is important to know whether the equilibrium contract
menus o¤ered to informed insureds or employees are su¢ ciently attractive to
encourage testing. The policy debate is extended by considering laws that gov-
ern access of outsiders (such as employers and insurers) to medical records. For
example, many laws require that medical records cannot be released to outsiders
without the consent of the patient. 50
6.1 A full information equilibriumwith uninformed agents
The basic analysis will follow Doherty and Thistle, 1996a. This model uses
fairly standard adverse selection technology and is illustrated with health insur-
ance. However, further works by Hoy and Polborn (2000) and Polborn, Hoy, and
Sadanand (2006) have shown that similar results can be derived in a life insur-
ance market where there is no natural choice of coverage and where individuals
can buy from many insurers.51
Consider the simplest case in which there are initially three groups, unin-
formed, informed high-risks and informed low-risks that are labeled U, H
and Lrespectively. The contracts o¤ered to each group will be labeled CU ,
CH and CL. We assume that type U has a probability qH of being high-risk so
we can rank the a priori loss probabilities as pH > pU > pL . If insurers know
the information and risk status of any individual (i.e. they know whether she
is U , H or L) the equilibrium competitive contracts are the rst best contracts
CU , C

H and C

L depicted in Figure 6. This conclusion seems pretty obvious but
there is a potential problem to be cleared before we can be comfortable with this
equilibrium contract set. If all the uninformed chose to become informed, then
the equilibrium contract set would contain only CH and C

L. Thus, we must
check when uninformed would choose to become informed and face a lottery
50For an overview of regulations and policy statements, see Hoel and Iversen (2002) and
Viswanathan et al (2007). The latter describe four major regulatory schemes for genetic
information in many states, from no regulation to the most strict regulatory structure: in the
Laissez-Faire approach, insurers have full freedom to request new tests, disclosure of existing
tests and to use tests results in underwriting and rating; under the Disclosure Duty approach,
individuals have to disclose to insurers the result of existing tests but cannot be required to
undergo additional tests, while under the Consent Law approach, consumers are not required
to divulge genetic tests results but if they do, insurers may use this information. Finally, in
the Strict Prohibition approach (there is a tendency in most countries to adopt this regulation
of information in health insurance policies), insurers cannot request genetic tests and cannot
use any genetic information in underwriting and rating.
51Because insurance companies dont share information about the amount of insurance
purchased by their customers in the context of life insurance, price-quantity contracts are not
feasible. As a consequence, insurers can only quote a uniform (average) premium for all life
insurance contracts. However, contrary to standard insurance setting, consumers can choose
the size of loss and this loss is positively dependent on the probability of death. Hence,
increasing symmetric information about risk type leads to changes in the demand for life
insurance and in the average price quoted by insurers, contrary to standard setting.
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over CH and C

L (the former if the test showed them to be high-risk and the lat-
ter if low-risk). In fact, the decision to become informed and receive policy CH
with probability qH , and receive policy CL with probability qL, is a fair lottery
(with the same expected value as staying with CU ) and would not be chosen by
a risk averse person. This conrms that the full information equilibrium is CU ,
CH and C

L.
6.2 Sequential equilibrium with insurer observing infor-
mation status but not risk type
It is a short step from this to consider what happens when the information status
is known to the insurer but not the risk status of those who are informed52 .
For this case and remaining ones in this section, we will look for sequential
Nash equilibria. In this case, the insurer can o¤er a full information zero prot
contract CU to the uninformed and the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts,
CH and C

L as shown again in Figure 6. The intuition for this pair is clear
when one consider that the uninformed can be identied and, by assumption,
the informed high-risks cannot masquerade as uninformed. To conrm this in
the equilibrium contract set, we must be sure that the uninformed choose to
remain so. The previous paragraph explained that the uninformed would prefer
to remain with CU than take the fair lottery of C

H and C

L. C

L would be strictly
preferred by an informed low-risk than the Rothschild-Stiglitz policy CL (which
has to satisfy the high-risk self-selection constraint). Thus, by transitivity, the
uninformed would prefer to remain with CU than face the lottery of C

H and
CL .
6.3 Sequential equilibrium when insurer cannot observe
information status or risk type
We now come to the more interesting case in which the information status
of individuals cannot be observed. This raises the interesting possibility that
people can take a test to become informed and, if the news is bad, pretend
they are uninformed. Because the insurer cannot observe information status, he
has no way of separating these wolves in sheepsclothing from the uninformed
sheep. This presents a problem for the uninformed. To signal that they are
really uninformed, and thus avoid subsidizing the high risks, they must accept
a contract that would satisfy a high-risk self-selection constraint. This contract,
C 00U is shown in Figure 6. Suppose for the time being they accept this contract.
Now what zero prot contract can be o¤ered to the informed low-risks? To
52This case may stretch plausibility slightly because it is di¢ cult to imagine an insurer
being able to verify that someone claiming to be uninformed is not really an informed high-
risk. However, we will present the case for completeness.
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prevent the uninformed buying a low-risk contract, the latter must satisfy an
uninformed risk self selection constraint and such a contract set is C 00L. Can
this triplet, CH , C
00
U , C
00
L be a equilibrium? The answer depends on the costs of
information.
If the uninformed could choose to stay at C 00U or become informed and take a
lottery over CH and C
00
L, what would they do? It turns out the value of the test
is positive. Even though the test introduces more risk, there is a compensating
factor that tips the balance in favor of the lottery. Remaining uninformed
entails a real cost; policy C 00U must bear risk to satisfy the high-risk self-selection
constraint. Thus, the uninformed will remain so only if the cost of the test is
su¢ ciently high. Accordingly the triplet CH , C
00
U , C
00
L can only be a Nash
equilibrium if there are high costs of testing. If the test costs are low, we
must consider another possible equilibrium. Suppose insurers expected all the
uninformed to take the test, but they could not observe risk status after the
test. In that case the only pair satisfying the high risk self selection constraint
is the Rothschild Stiglitz pair, CH and C

L . It is fairly straightforward to show
that, if the uninformed remained so, they would choose CL over C

H . Thus the
choice for the uninformed is to keep CL valued without knowledge of risk type,
or face a lottery between CH (valued with full information of high-risk type)
and CL (valued with knowledge of low-risk status). It turns out that the value
of this lottery is zero. Thus, if the cost of information was zero, and using a
tie breaker rule, the uninformed would take the test and the pair, CH , C

L is a
sequential Nash equilibrium. Regardless of the cost of the test, this cannot be
an equilibrium.
We can now summarize. If the costs of information are su¢ ciently high,
there is a sequential equilibrium set CH , C
00
U , C
00
L . If the information costs
are positive but below a threshold, then no sequential Nash equilibrium exists.
Finally, there is a knife edge case with an equilibrium of CH , C

L which exists
only with zero cost of information.
Insert Figure 6 here.
Hoel et al (2006) show that the introduction of heterogeneity about perceived
probability of becoming ill in the future allows to circumvent this non-existence
of equilibrium. In Hoel et al (2006), testing is assumed to be costless, but con-
sumers di¤er with respect to the disutility or anxiety of being informed about
future health risk. Using a model with state-dependent utility, the authors as-
sume that some individuals are attracted to chance, while others are repelled by
chance. The rst ones are more reluctant to choose testing than the second ones.
Like Doherty and Thistle (1996), Hoel et al (2006) conclude that a regulatory
regime in which the use of genetic information by insurers is allowed is better
than one in which it is prohibited, but in contrast to Doherty and Thistle (1996),
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they obtain that more people undertake the test when test results are veriable
than when they are not. Indeed, in uncertain but symmetric information set-
ting, when being o¤ered full insurance contracts, some individuals su¢ ciently
repeled from chance choose to take a test. When information is asymmetric with
test results being veriable, untested individuals are o¤ered partial insurance, to
dissuade high-risk agents from claiming that they were not tested. By relaxing
the veriability of test results, both (tested) low-risk and untested agents are
o¤ered partial insurance to dissuade untested agents to claim being low-risk. In
contrast to Doherty and Thistle (1996) who nd that all agents choose to be
tested when insurers cannot distinguish between untested agents and high-risk
agents (for c = 0), Hoel et al (2006) explain why some consumers prefer to stay
uninformed even when information on test status is asymmetric.
For other models of insurance purchasing decisions with state dependent
utilities, see also Strohmenger and Wambach (2000) who argue that results
from standard insurance market models may not be simply transferred to health
insurance markets (due to the assumption that treatment costs are sometimes
higher than willingness to pay). State-contingent utilities take into account the
fact that people in case of illness have the choice between undergoing a treatment
or su¤ering from their diseases. Here again, making the results of genetic tests
available to the insurer might be welfare improving.
6.4 The Case of Consent Laws
One of the interesting policy applications of this analysis is consent laws. Many
states have enacted laws governing the disclosure of information from genetic
(and other medical) tests. The typical law allows the patient to choose whether
to divulge information revealed by the test to an employer or insurer. This issue
was considered by Tabarrock (1994) who suggested that consent laws would
encourage people to take the test. This was examined further by Doherty and
Thistle (1996b), who derive alternative Nash equilibria under consent laws. The
principal feature of their analysis is that informed low-risks can verify their low-
risk status by presenting the results of the test. Alternatively, informed high-
risks will conceal their identity, i.e., withhold consent. This leads to a potential
equilibrium containing policies of set A  {CH , C 00U , CL} or set B  {CH , CL}.
For B to be an equilibrium, the uninformed must choose to take a diagnostic
test when faced with this contract menu. The value of information, I(B), turns
out to be positive; this can only be an equilibrium if the information value
exceeds the cost of the diagnostic test, c. The other possible equilibrium, A,
can hold only if the uninformed remains so. Because the value of information
is positive, the equilibrium can only hold if the cost of the test is su¢ ciently
high to discourage testing, I(A) < c. Thus, the possible equilibria are A if the
cost of the test is su¢ ciently high and B if the cost of the test is su¢ ciently
low. There are possible situations where no Nash equilibrium exists or where
there are multiple equilibria. Summarizing:
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I(A) < c < I(B) two equilibrium sets, A and B
c < I(A); I(B) equilibrium set is B
I(A); I(B) < c equilibrium set is A
I(A) > c > I(B) no Nash equilibrium exists.
In the context of life insurance, Hoy and Polborn (2000) and later Polborn,
Hoy, Sadanand (2006) obtain positive and normative results that are either
consistent with or di¤er from those described in standard insurance setting. A
signicant di¤erence is that prohibiting insurance from using information about
risk type may increase welfare. In a static setting with initial adverse selection,
Hoy and Polborn (2000) argue that genetic testing has a possible dimension
for providing positive social value by allowing better informed consumption
choices (while in Doherty and Thistle, the social value of the testing opportunity
is negative). The authors construct three scenarios in which the existence of
the test is either Pareto-worsening, Pareto-improving, or is worse o¤ for some
consumers and better o¤ for others. The intuition why additional information
may lead to a private benet is as follows. Even if the average equilibrium
premium increases as a result of testing, those who are tested (with good or bad
news) gain because they can adjust their life insurance demand to their real
risk type. In a three-period model, Polborn, Hoy and Sadanand (2006) assume
that people can buy term insurance covering the risk of death either early in life
(period 1) before they have received information about their mortality risk and
before risk type is known and/or later (period 2) after they have received this
information (people face the risk of death only at the beginning of period 3).
Here again, if there are su¢ ciently few individuals who receive bad news about
their genetic type, restricting insurers from using information about genetic
testing may provide alternative assurance against the risk of classication, in
combination with a cap that limits adverse selection.
However, empirical studies deal with the consequences of a ban on the use
of genetic testing in life insurance. Hoy and Witt (2007) provide an economic
welfare analysis of the adverse selection costs associated with regulations that
ban insurers from access to these tests for the specic case of information relating
to breast cancer. These adverse selection costs are shown to be very modest in
most circumstances and the authors argue in favor of restricting the use of
genetic test results for rate-making purposes. Using a discrete Markov chain
model, Viswanathan et al (2007) nd similar results. They track the insurance
demand behavior of many cohorts of women who can change their life insurance
benet at the end of each policy year, inuenced by the results of tests relating
to breast and ovarian cancers (and consequently by their premium changes).
6.5 Moral hazard, public health and AIDS testing
If the costs and benets to patients of the potential use of information in in-
surance markets when consent laws are in place are considered, the value of
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information is positive, and insurance markets can be encouraged to endorse
testing. Whether people actually take medical tests also depends on the costs
of those tests. These costs are critical in determining which, if any, Nash equilib-
rium exists. One can generalize the discussion and talk not simply of the costs
of the test but also of other benets. Quite obviously, testing yields a medical
diagnosis that can be useful in treating any revealed condition. In general we
would expect this option for treatment to have a positive private and social
value (see Doherty and Posey, 1998). Accounting for the private value of this
option has the same e¤ect as lowering the cost of the test and tends to favor
the equilibrium contract set B in which all people take the test. However, this
opens up the wider issue of other costs and benets to acquiring information
related to risk status.
An interesting twist on this literature concerns the case of AIDS testing.
The result that insurance markets tend to raise the private benet from testing
may be reassuring to those interested in public health who normally consider
testing for diseases such as AIDS and inherited disorders to be socially bene-
cial. Several studies have analyzed behavioral choices in sexual activities and
their e¤ect on the transmission of AIDS and the e¤ectiveness of public health
measures (Castillo-Chavez and Hadeler, 1994 and Kremer, 1996). The work of
Philipson and Posner (1993) is particularly pertinent: they examine the e¤ect of
taking AIDS test on opportunities to engage in high-risk sexual activity. With-
out going into detail, the point can be made by recognizing that people might
take the test to verify their uninfected status so they can persuade partners to
engage in high-risk sexual activity. Without such certication, they may have
been unable to secure partners for high-risk sex. While this is only one part of
their analysis, it is su¢ cient to illustrate their point that AIDS testing can con-
ceivably increase the spread of the disease. In spite of the possible social costs
of testing, it also shows there are private benets to diagnostic tests because
they expand opportunities for sexual trade.
This works tends to tilt the previous analysis of insurance equilibrium at least
for the case of AIDS testing. The insurance equilibrium required a comparison
of the costs of testing with the value of (insurance) information revealed by the
test. Philipson and Posner (1993) report an exogenous private benet of testing.
Such a private benet is the same as lowering the cost of testing. Accordingly,
it creates a bias in favor of those equilibria in which all individuals are fully
informed of their risk status; i.e. contract set B.
Hoel and Iversen (2002) extend Doherty and Thistles (1996) results by tak-
ing into account the availability of preventive measures (as private informa-
tion).53 In addition to focusing on the regulation of access to information about
53See also Fagart and Fombaron (2006) for a discussion of the value of information un-
der alternative assumptions about what information is available to insurers in a model with
preventive measures.
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individual test status,54 Hoel and Iversen (2002) are interested in the possible
ine¢ ciencies due to a compulsory/voluntary mix of health insurance.55 First,
they show that genetic testing and prevention may not be undertaken although
testing is socially e¢ cient (this ine¢ ciency is likely to occur for systems with
high proportion of compulsory insurance). However, tests may be undertaken
when testing is socially ine¢ cient (more likely for systems with substantial vol-
untary supplementary insurance and more important the less prevention is).
Finally, while the above-mentioned models have investigated primary pre-
vention (which reduces the probability of illness), Barigozzi and Henriet (2009)
consider a model in which secondary prevention measures (which reduces the
health loss when illness occurs) are available. They characterize market out-
comes under the four regulatory schemes described by Viswanathan et al (2007)
and derive an unambiguous ranking of these schemes in terms of social welfare.
The Disclosure Duty approach weakly dominates all the other regulatory struc-
tures. At the other extreme, the Strict Prohibition approach is dominated by
all the other regulatory schemes. The Laissez-Faire and the Consent Law ap-
proaches appear to be intermediate situations.
7 Concluding remarks: extensions to the basic
models
7.1 Risk categorization and residual adverse selection
Adverse selection can explain the use of risk categorization in insurance markets
based on variables that procure information at a low cost (Hoy, 1982; Browne
and Kamiya, 2012). For example, in automobile insurance, age and sex vari-
ables are signicant in explaining probabilities of accidents and insurance premia
(Dionne and Vanasse, 1992, Puelz and Snow, 1994; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000;
Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse, 2001, 2006). Particularly, young male drivers
(under age 25) are much riskier to insure than the average driver. Because it is
almost costless to observe age and sex, an insurer may nd it protable to o¤er
policies with higher premiums to young males. However, such categorization is
now prohibited in some states and countries. For surveys on adverse selection
and risk classication, see Crocker and Snow (2012) and Dionne and Rothschild
(2011).
Dahlby (1983, 1992) provides empirical evidence that adverse selection is
present in the Canadian automobile insurance market. He also suggests that
54As in Doherty and Thistle, an individual decides whether or not he wishes to obtain the
information from testing.
55More precisely, voluntary health insurance is considered as a supplement to compulsory
insurance.
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his empirical results are in accordance with the Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence model
that allows for cross-subsidization between individuals in each segment dened
by a categorization variable such as sex or age: low-coverage policies (low-risks)
subsidizing high-coverage policies (high-risks) in each segment56 . This impor-
tant statistical result raises the following question: Does statistical categoriza-
tion enhance e¢ ciency in the presence of adverse selection? In other words, can
welfare be improved by using the public information on agentscharacteristics
(such that age and sex) in o¤ering insurance contracts in the presence of adverse
selection? Crocker and Snow (1985, 1986) show that, if the observable variables
are correlated with hidden knowledge, costless imperfect categorization always
enhances e¢ ciency where e¢ ciency is dened as in Harris and Townsend (1981).
Another important contribution in Crocker and Snow (1986) concerns the exis-
tence of a balanced-budget tax-subsidy system that provides private incentives
to use costless categorization. Note that the corresponding tax is imposed on
contracts, not on individuals. If a redistribution is made from gains earned on
the group in which low-risks are predominant (e.g. old male drivers) to the
group in which high-risks are predominant (young male drivers), the classica-
tion always permits expansion of the set of feasible contracts. The reason is
that the use of categorization relaxes the incentive compatibility constraints.
As a result, with appropriate taxes, no agent loses as a result of categorization.
The results are shown for the Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence equilibrium concept but
can also sustain an e¢ cient allocation in a Nash equilibrium with a tax system
(Crocker and Snow, 1986). These conclusions can be applied to the Wilson
anticipatory equilibrium or to the Riley reactive equilibrium, for some values
of parameters, both with a tax system. It then becomes clear that prohibit-
ing discrimination on equity considerations imposes e¢ ciency costs in insurance
markets (such as automobile insurance where categorization based on age and
sex variables is costless).
Finally, Crocker and Snow (1986) argue that the welfare e¤ects are ambigu-
ous when categorical pricing is costly. In contrast, Rothschild (2011) shows
that Crocker and Snows (1986) result that categorical pricing bans are ine¢ -
cient applies even when the categorical pricing technology is costly. In practice,
if the government provides breakeven partial social insurance and allows rms
to categorize with supplemental contracts, the market will choose to employ the
categorical pricing only when doing so is Pareto-improving. In other words, pro-
viding partial social insurance socializes the provision of the cross-subsidization.
In recent empirical studies, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne, Gouriéroux
and Vanasse (2001, 2006) (see also Gouriéroux, 1999) showed that risk classica-
tion is e¢ cient to eliminate asymmetric information from an insurers portfolio,
in the sense that there is no residual asymmetric information in the portfolio
56However, Riley (1983) argued that the statistical results of Dahlby (1983) are also consis-
tent with both the Wilson anticipatory equilibrium (1977) and the Riley reactive equilibrium
(1979). Both models reject cross-subsidization.
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studied (see Richaudeau, 1999, for an application with a di¤erent data set).57
They conclude that the insurer was able to control for asymmetric informa-
tion by using an appropriate risk classication procedure. Consequently, no
other self-selection mechanisms inside the risk classes (such as the choice of de-
ductible) are necessary to reduce the impact of asymmetric information, which
justify active underwriting activities by insurers (Browne and Kamiya, 2012).
See Chiappori and Salanié (2012) and Dionne (2012) for more detailed analyzes
of methodologies to isolate information problems in insurance data.
7.2 Multi-dimensional adverse selection
Up to now, it was assumed that risk categories are determined up to the loss
probability. However, residual asymmetric information between the insured
and the insurers could consist of attitude toward risk. Villeneuve (2003) and
Smart (2000) explore the implication of assuming that di¤erences in risk aversion
combined with di¤erences in accident probabilities create a multi-dimensional
adverse selection problem where the equilibrium allocation di¤ers qualitatively
from the classical results of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In Villeneuve (2003),
not only may positive prots be sustainable under several equilibrium concepts
(Nash, Rothschild and Stiglitz, Wilson, Riley), but equilibria with random con-
tracts are also possible. The former situation is more likely when low-risk agents
are more risk averse, whereas the latter is more likely when the low-risk is less
risk averse. Villeneuve explores the origin of these phenomena. He gives nec-
essary and su¢ cient conditions for the comparison of risk aversions that either
guarantee or exclude atypical equilibria.
In a companion paper, Smart (2000) obtains similar results. In his model,
indi¤erence curves of customers may cross twice; thus the single crossing prop-
erty does not hold. When di¤erences in risk aversion are su¢ ciently large, rms
cannot use policy deductibles to screen high-risk customers. Types may be
pooled in equilibrium or separated by raising premiums above actuarially fair
levels. This leads to excessive entry of rms in equilibrium.58
Wambach (2000) has extended the model of RS by incorporating hetero-
geneity with respect to privately known initial wealth.59 He assumes four unob-
servable types of individuals; those with high or low-risk with either high or low
wealth. When the wealth levels are not too far apart, then types with di¤erent
wealth but the same risk are pooled, while di¤erent risks are separated. The
possibility of double-crossing indi¤erence curves occurs for large di¤erences in
57 In contrast, Cohen (2005) does not reject residual asymmetric information with data from
Israel.
58See also Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) for an analysis of a monopolistic insurer with
unobserved di¤erences in risk aversion.
59Similar conclusions would be obtained if individuals di¤ered in the size of losses (in addi-
tion to the di¤erence in risk).
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wealth. In this case, self-selection contracts that earn positive prot might hold
in equilibrium. However, in Villeneuve (2003) and Wambach (2000), insurers
are restricted to o¤ering only one contract each (in and o¤-the-equilibrium).60
Snow (2009) argues that protable contracting advanced in these modied
Rothschild-Stiglitz environments cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium un-
der competitive conditions, if insurers are allowed to o¤er menus of contracts.
In the three above-mentioned models, the conguration in which the high-risk
contract breaks even while the low-risk contract earns a positive prot cannot be
a two-stage Nash equilibrium; there always exists a pair of incentive-compatible
and jointly protable contracts attractive to both risk types (an unprotable
contract with full coverage attracting only high-risks and a protable contract
attracting low-risks). Similar reasoning applies to the model investigated by
Sonnenholzner and Wambach (2009), combining moral hazard with adverse se-
lection.61
Snow (2009) resolves the problem of non-existence of equilibrium in the
related instances by appealing to the three-stage game introduced by Hellwig
(1987). When insurers can modify their contractual o¤ers in a third stage of
the contracting game, the breakeven pooling contract is the strategically stable
Nash equilibrium.
Other studies, including Fluet and Pannequin (1997), Crocker and Snow
(2011) and Koehl and Villeneuve (2001), focus on situations where two types of
individuals with multiple risks coexist. Fluet and Pannequin (1997) analyze two
situations: one where insurers o¤er comprehensive policies against all sources of
risk (complete insurance) and one where di¤erent risks are covered by separate
policies (incomplete contracts). In the second case, they analyze the possibility
that the insurer has perfect information about the coverage of other risks by
any insurer in the market. They show that when market conditions allow for
bundling (getting information to protect insurers against undesirable risks), the
low-risk individual in a particular market (or for a particular source of risk)
does not necessarily buy partial insurance in that market as in the Rothschild
and Stiglitz model.
Their analysis emphasizes the trade-o¤ between bundling and spanning.
Multiple-risk contracts allow for perfect spanning (taking correlations between
di¤erent risks into account) and for perfect bundling (considering all informa-
tion available to the insurers) while single contracts with imperfect information
on contract choice for other risks are inferior because they do not permit risk
diversication and information sharing. They show that the former is the more
e¢ cient which conrms the practice by insurers in many countries.
60 In contrast, Smart restricts the entry by a xed barrier.
61 In this model, one case in which protable self-selection contracting arises, with patient
types only partially covered exerting high e¤ort (while impatient types exert low e¤ort and
receive a lower coverage).
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In contrast with Fluet and Pannequin who consider the possibility to bundle
several (independent) risks, Crocker and Snow (2011) decompose a given risk of
loss into its distinct potential causes. The knowledge of the conditional proba-
bility of a particular peril occurring is private as in the model of one-dimensional
screening, but applicants signal their type in more than one dimension through
the choice of a vector of deductibles. Bundling of coverage for all the perils into
a single policy is e¢ cient as in Fluet and Pannequin (relative to the solution
where the perils were covered by separate contracts) and does not fundamentally
alter the structure of screening; high-risks are una¤ected by the introduction of
multidimensional screening while low-risks obtain more coverage than the high-
risks for perils from which they are more likely to su¤er. By reducing the
externality cost that low-risk agents must bear to distinguish themselves from
high-risk agents, multidimensional screening enhances the e¢ ciency of insur-
ance contracting and circumvents the non-existence problem (by decreasing the
critical value above which Nash equilibrium exists).
In the same spirit, Koehl and Villeneuve (2001) consider a multiple-risk
environment, but in which exclusivity cannot be enforced and insurers are spe-
cialized. The authors compare the prots of the global monopoly and the sum
of the prots each monopoly would make in the absence of the other. It is shown
that specialization prevents second-best e¢ ciency because it weakens insurers
ability to screen applicants. Even if the market exhibits a form of complementar-
ity that limits the conict between the insurers (by limiting the conict between
insurers, specialization implicitly sustains collusion between competitors), there
are e¢ ciency losses due to specialization, and the prots at the industry level
are decreased.
7.3 Symmetric incomplete information
According to recent empirical studies that test the presence of adverse selection
in automobile insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000, and Dionne,
Gouriéroux and Vanasse, 2001), it seems that we can reject the presence of
residual asymmetric information in some markets. More precisely, even though
there is potential adverse selection on these markets, insurers are able to extract
all information on individualsrisk type through very ne risk categorization.
By focusing on these recent empirical results, de Garidel (2005) rejects the
presence of initial asymmetries of information and, on the contrary, assumes
that information between insurers and insureds is incomplete, but initially sym-
metric (at the beginning of a two-period contract). He provides a dynamic
competitive model in which each agent, together with his initial insurer, learns
about his type through accidents. However, other insurers may not, depending
on informational structures.
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In the absence of ex-ante adverse selection, he shows that (i) keeping in-
formation about accident claims private is welfare-improving, (ii) such a policy
does not jeopardize the existence of an equilibrium, and (iii) this equilibrium
exhibits both bonus and malus.Thus, in a two-period model, adverse selection
arises endogenously through di¤erentiated learning about type and leads to re-
consider the widespread idea according to which competition in markets with
adverse selection may be undesirable. Indeed, de Garidel (2005) shows that it
is welfare-enhancing to produce adverse selection of this kind.62
7.4 Reversed adverse selection and double-sided adverse
selection
In the literature on decentralized markets under asymmetric information it
is commonly assumed that the uninformed party possesses all the bargaining
power. This is also the usual assumption of insurance models, whereas it is often
argued that companies may be better able to assess the risk of an individual
than this individual himself. The paper by Bourgeon (1998) reverses this usual
assumption, giving the relevant information to the insurers, in addition to the
bargaining power. Under this hypothesis, the insurersactivity is not only to
sell a particular good or service but also to produce a diagnosis of the buyers
needs. This is the case in some insurance markets, including health and life,
where the sellers appear to be the experts in the relationship.
Assuming risk-averse buyers and risk-neutral sellers, the focus of Bourgeons
model is on symmetric-steady state equilibria of the market game. The only
candidates for equilibria are semi-separating ones, i.e., equilibria where the buy-
ers carrying the good state of nature are partially pooled with the low-state
ones.Separating equilibria is invalid simply because they violate the sellersin-
centive constraints: Assuming a separating equilibrium, the equilibrium con-
tracts involve full coverage of the damages, which are the same in both states
accident and no-accident. The only di¤erence between these contracts is thus
the premium, which is higher for the high-risk individuals. A seller would thus
increase its prot by o¤ering the high-risk contract to a low-risk buyer. A pool-
ing equilibrium cannot occur because of a trickier reason related to the (limited)
monopoly power of sellers: knowing that its competitors propose a pooling con-
tract, a seller o¤ers a contract corresponding to the buyers reservation value.
Because the contract is pooling, however, the buyer cannot revise his beliefs
and his reservation value is unchanged since his entrance in the market. Conse-
quently, he has no reason to begin a time-consuming search, and therefore the
market shuts down. If an equilibrium exists, it thus entails a search, which is
long-lasting for all buyers carrying a bad state: sellers always propose high-risk
contracts, but because there is a chance that the buyers risk is low, he visits
62See Cohen (2012) for a model of asymmetric learning among insurers on insured risk.
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several sellers before accepting this contract. Moreover, he is never convinced
of the true price, and sellers consequently charge a lower price than they would
charge if the buyer knew the true information. The informational asymmetry is
thus advantageous to the high-risk individuals, because they are not charged the
entire risk premium corresponding to this state. When choosing a contract for
a low-risk, a seller balances between o¤ering the contract for low-risks, which
is certain to be accepted by the buyer but gives small prots, and o¤ering a
high-risk contract, which is accepted only by some of the buyers but is more
protable.
In a static approach, Fagart (1996b) explores a competitive market of insur-
ance where two companies compete for one consumer. Information is asymmet-
ric in the sense that companies know the value of a parameter ignored by the
consumer. The model is a signalling one, so that insureds are able to interpret
o¤ered insurance contracts as informative signals and may accept one among
these o¤ers or reject them. The features of the equilibrium solution are the
following: the information is systematically revealed and prots are zero.
Villeneuve (2000) studies the consequences for a monopolistic insurance rm
of evaluating risk better than customers under the adverse selection hypothesis
reversed. In a more general model (Villeneuve, 2005), he suggests that infor-
mation retention and ine¢ ciency have to be expected in many contexts. In a
competitive insurance market, he shows that neither revelation of information
nor e¢ ciency are warranted, and that the surplus may be captured by some
insurers rather than the consumers. Thus, in his model, the classical predic-
tions of Rothschild and Stiglitz are reversed: types may be pooled, high-risk
consumers may remain uninsured or obtain partial coverage, and prots are not
always zero. The key argument is that the way consumers interpret o¤ers may
restrict competitive behavior in the ordinary sense.
Seog (2009) formalizes a double-sided adverse selection by decomposing the
risk of a policyholder into two risks: a general risk and a specic risk. He
considers that each party to the insurance contract has superior information;
policyholders have superior information about specic risk while insurers have
superior information about general risk (for example, policyholders have su-
perior information on their own driving habits, but automobile insurers have
superior information about accident risks). High-general-risk consumers are
self-insured in equilibrium while low-general-risk consumers are covered by an
insurance contract (full insurance for high-specic-risk people and partial insur-
ance for low-specic-risk people). As a consequence, when insurers make their
information about general risk public, e¢ ciency is unambigously improved.
Chassagnon and Villeneuve (2005) and Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) propose
two extensions of the classical model in which each party knows something that
the other does not. Assuming less than perfect risk perception (subjective be-
liefs), Chassagnon and Villeneuve (2005) characterize the e¢ cient frontier in a
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competitive setting, while Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) analyze the equilibrium
between a monopolistic insurer confronted with policyholders having beliefs dif-
ferent from the objective probabilities (the authors formalize this disparity using
the Rank Dependent Expected Utility model proposed by Quiggin, 1982, and
Yaari, 1987). Both papers nd that the optimal o¤er can be a pooling contract
and that better risks can be better covered.
7.5 Uberrima Fides
An insurance contract is under uberrima des when an insured makes a full
disclosure of all facts pertaining to his risk that are known to him ex-ante.
Under this type of arrangement, the insurer asks questions about the individual
risk at the signing of the contract, but keep the right to investigate the truth
only when the claim is made, to reduce the audit costs. If the answers are found
to be false, the insurer can refuse to pay the claim. This scheme provides a
new way to select low-risks at a lower social cost than the Rothschild-Stiglitz
method. Some life insurers used individuals declarations about their smoking
behavior to set insurance prices. In fact, Dixit (2000) shows that uberrima des
is Pareto-improving when compared to Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium.
7.6 Adverse Selection and Participating Contracts
The literature on insurance contract design has focused on non-participating
contracts, even if participating contracts are more consistent with Borchs mu-
tualization principle. In the non-participating contracts, the premiums are con-
ditioned only on the individual loss (the risk is only transferred to an external
risk bearer (stock insurer)), whereas participating contracts condition payout
both on the individual loss and the portfolio experience (the premium is subject
to a retroactive adjustment or dividend, which depends on the collective loss
experience of the pool).
Extending the earlier work of Borch (1962), Marshall (1974) argues that, in
the presence of aggregate or social risk and in the absence of adverse selection,
mutual insurance is more e¢ cient, unless there are enough independent risks
that the law of large numbers to be applied. In the same spirit, Doherty and
Dionne (1993) show how the composite risk transfer implicit in mutual insurance
(weakly) dominates the simple risk transfer implicit in stock insurance. They
suggest that an e¢ cient insurance contract will decompose risk into diversiable
(or idiosyncratic) and non-diversiable elements and will let the parties bargain
on the sharing of each component.
Smith and Stutzer (1990) introduce adverse selection with undiversiable
aggregate risk. Owing to their participating nature, mutual insurance policies
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are an e¢ cient risk-sharing mechanism. Smith and Stutzer show that high-
risk policyholders fully insure against both individual and aggregate risk, while
low-risk individuals partially insure against both risk types.
Because small mutual insurance rms appear to be less risk sharing, Ligon
and Thistle (2005) argue that they must o¤er their policyholders other advan-
tages, namely in solving problems of adverse selection. Even in the absence
of aggregate risk, their analysis suggests that organization size may be an im-
portant component of the institutional structure and provides an alternative
explanation both for the existence of mutual insurance rms and for the coex-
istence of stock and mutual insurers. Ligon and Thistle assume that even when
a risk pool cannot control its composition directly (due to adverse selection),
adverse selection can create incentives for the formation of distinct mutual insur-
ers. Adverse selection limits the size of these low-risk mutuals. The combination
of stock and mutual insurers is thus shown to solve adverse selection problems,
by allowing consumers to choose from a menu of contracts.
As in Smith and Stutzer,63 high-risk individuals buy conventional xed-
premium policies from stock insurers while low-risk individuals from mutuals.
In addition, Ligon and Thistle derive the conditions64 under which stock insurers
(for the monopoly and competitive cases) and mutual insurers can coexist, and
show that the mutual can o¤er higher expected indemnity to low-risk members
than the stock insurance policy without attracting high-risk individuals. Low
risk individuals are strictly better o¤ forming mutuals than buying stock insur-
ance policies. High-risk individuals are no worse o¤ (under monopoly) or are
strictly better o¤ (under competition) buying insurance from the stock insurer
than joining the mutual. Finally one empirical implication of their theoreti-
cal analysis is that adverse selection may create incentives for some mutuals to
be small (while there is no corresponding incentive for stock insurers). Ligon
and Thistle nd the empirical distribution of insurer size by type corresponds
precisely with what their theoretical analysis predicts.
More recently, Picard (2009) nds that allowing insurers to o¤er either non-
participating or participating policies guarantees the existence of an equilibrium
in the Rothschild/Stiglitz model. Participating policies act as an implicit threat
that dissuades deviant insurers that would like to attract low-risk agents only
(when there is cross-subsidization between risk types) and the WMS allocation
can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. In
words, an equilibrium holds with high-risk agents having taken out a participat-
ing policy subsidized by low-risk individuals because if low-risk agents switch to
another insurer, the situation of high-risk agents deteriorates because of the par-
ticipating nature of their insurance contract. Consequently, it is more di¢ cult
63Even if their approach di¤ers from Smith and Stutzer because the problem is one of
cooperative game theory.
64The conditions under which this separating equilibrium exists are analogous to those
under which a separating equilibrium exists in the standard Rothschild/Stiglitz model.
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for the deviant insurer to attract only low-risk types without attracting high-risk
types as well. When there is no equilibrium in the Rothschild/Stiglitz model
with non-participating contracts, an equilibrium with cross-subsidized partici-
pating contracts actually exists. Further, this model predicts that the mutual
corporate form should be prevalent in insurance lines with cross-subsidization
between risk types, while there should be stock insurers in other cases.
In each of these models, coexistence of stock and mutual insurers occurs
because of either exogenous aggregate risk (Doherty and Dionne (1993), Smith
and Stutzer (1990)) or adverse selection (Smith and Stutzer (1990), Ligon and
Thistle (2005), Picard (2009)). A third explanation for the coexistence of mu-
tual and stock insurers focuses on the possibility of a stock insurers becoming
insolvent (i.e. unable to pay all the promised indemnities). Rees, Gravelle and
Wambach (1999) take into account this possibility and assume that insolvency
can be avoided by choosing appropriate capital funds, and that agents are fully
informed about this choice. In a somewhat similar vein, Fagart Fombaron and
Jeleva (2002) consider that when unbounded losses are possible, insolvency can-
not be excluded. The contracts a stock insurer company o¤ers imply a xed
premium that may be negatively adjusted at the end of the contractual period
when the losses of stock insurers are too large to be covered by the companys
reserves (capital funds and the collected premia), while the optimal contract
o¤ered by a mutual rm involves a systematic ex-post adjustment (negative or
positive). These assumptions point to a network e¤ect in insurance (or size
e¤ect): the expected utility of an agent insured by a mutual rm is an increas-
ing function of its number of members. For the insurance companies, network
externalities also exist but are positive or negative depending on the amount of
the capital funds. In an oligopoly game, either one mutual rm or insurance
company is active in equilibrium, or a mixed structure emerges in which two
or more companies share the market with or without a mutual rm. Bourlès
(2009) extends this analysis by endogenizing the choice of capital and gives a
rationale for mutualization and demutualization waves.
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Figure 3 : One-period competitive contracts with full information
Wealth in 
loss state
Wealth in    
no-loss state
 
 C0
C1
V(C1| pH) 
H
L
W-D
W
C2
F
 V(C1| pL)
Figure 4a : Inexistence of a Rothschild-Stiglitz pooling equilibrium
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Figure 4b : Existence of a Rothschild and Stiglitz separating equilibrium
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Figure 5 : A Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence equilibrium
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Figure 6 : Endogenous information
